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IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL OF
THE UNDOCUMENTED FAMILY
CAROL SANGER*

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 1 Congress' attempt to clean up the problem of illegal immigration in the
United States, puts a great number of undocumented alien families,
4
mostly Mexican,2 to a hard test. Under IRCA's amnesty provisions,
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1976; B.A., Wellesley College, 1970. 1 thank Ed Baker, Patty Blum, Sandra Coliver,
Alma Garcia, Warren Leiden, Mark Miller, and Gerry Neuman for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). IRCA amends provisions in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011557 (1982)).
2. See Closing the Door?, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1984, at 18, 22 (table based on U.S. Bureau
of Census estimates).
3. In this article the term "undocumented family" means any nuclear family that includes a
parent or child who is an undocumented or "illegal" alien. An undocumented family may, for
instance, include citizens. Anyone "born or naturalized in" and "subject to the jurisdiction" of the
United States is a citizen of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898). But see P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 116 (1985) (urging that "'subject to
the jurisdiction' of the United States should be read to embody the public law's conception of
consensual membership, and therefore to refer only to children of those legally admitted to permanent residence in the American community-that is, citizens and legal resident aliens") (emphasis added).
4. IRCA provides for the adjustment of status of three categories of aliens. First, IRCA provides for adjustment of status from undocumented to temporary resident status-a new status in
the immigration law-through a general amnesty. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(l)(A) (West. Supp.
1987) (requiring the Attorney General to adjust an eligible alien to legal temporary resident status if the alien applies for adjustment sometime during a 12-month adjustment or amnesty period). Temporary resident status under the general amnesty may be adjusted to permanent resident status during a one-year period beginning with the nineteenth month following the
adjustment to temporary resident status. Id. § 1255a(b)(1)(A).
Second, IRCA provides adjustment to temporary resident status for "Special Agricultural
Workers" (SAWs)-another new immigration law classification-through a special amnesty.
SAWs are resident undocumented aliens who provided "seasonal agricultural services" in the
United States for at least 90 "man-days" between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. 8 U.S.C.A. §
1160(a)(I)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring the Attorney General to adjust certain alien
SAWs to a legal temporary resident status if the alien applies for adjustment sometime during an
18-month adjustment or amnesty period). See generally Wide Fraud Is Found Among Illegal
Aliens Who Seek Amnesty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1987, at AI, col. I (aliens misrepresenting their
employment histories to become eligible as SAWs). SAWs may adjust to permanent resident status. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1160(a)(2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1987) (providing for 350,000 "Group I" adjustments to occur after one year and a day of the deadline for application for adjustment to
temporary resident status as a SAW, and for "Group 2" adjustments to occur after two years and
a day of the deadline for application for adjustment). "Seasonal Agricultural Services" are defined at id. § 1160(h).
Third, IRCA provides for the adjustment of certain aliens from Cuba and Haiti to a legal
permanent resident status. Id. § 1255a note. This article discusses issues arising out of the adjust-
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every alien must individually meet the eligibility requirements, such as
having lived in the United States since before January 1, 1982.1 But
many aliens who satisfy these requirements have spouses or children
who do not. Thus, while eligible aliens may adjust to a legal immigration status, their ineligible family members must either leave the
United States or remain illegally, subject to deportation when
apprehended.
IRCA's failure to treat families as a unit forces many undocumented
aliens to balance the opportunities of legalization against the potential
disruption of their families:6 a harsh and unusual choice in the context
of American immigration law, which incorporates the principles of
family unity throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 7
Numerically unrestricted admissions for immediate relatives of United
States citizens,' immigrant preference categories based on degrees of
kinship,9 and suspensions of deportation based on hardship to immediate relatives who are citizens or permanent residents"0 are three examples of the INA's deference and commitment to family relationships."
ment to temporary resident status through the general amnesty.
As of January 1988, only 1.2 million aliens have applied for adjustment of status. This figure
falls far below the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimate that between 2 million
and 3.9 million aliens would take advantage of amnesty. Amnesty Requests by Aliens Decline,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, § 1,at 1,col. I (the 1.2 million figure includes 240,000 SAWs and
904,000 applying under IRCA's general amnesty). The disappointing statistics have led to calls
for an extension of the amnesty. S.2015, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (to extend for one year the
application period under the legalization program); H.R. 3816, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (to
extend for one year the application period under the legalization program). See generally D.
MEISSNER & D. PAPADEMETRIOU, THE LEGALIZATION COUNTDOWN: A THIRD QUARTER ASSESSMENT (1988) [hereinafter LEGALIZATION COUNTDOWN] (concluding that IRCA's legalization
program is destined to be an enormous failure without an immediate change of policy).
5. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1987) (general amnesty provisions) (providing
that applicants must prove a continuous residence in the United States since before January 1,
1982 through the application date); see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,210-11 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 245a.2(d)(3)-(4)) (requisite proof of continuous presence).
6. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987) (waiver of certain exclusions "in
the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest"). This section of the Act relating to waivable grounds for exclusion of
aliens is the only provision in IRCA that by its terms addresses family unity.
See generally Mexican Families, U.S. Firms Depend on Illegal Migration, Wash. Post, Nov.
15, 1987, at A6, col. 1; INS Is Expected to Ease Amnesty Rules to Avoid Splitting Immigrant
Families, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1987, at 2, col. 3; The Grief in New Alien Law: Some Families
Must Separate, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at Al, col. 1;A Family's Struggle to Stay in U.S.,
L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col 1.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)). "In 1986 only one-tenth of all legal immigrants
entered the U.S. without benefit of a family tie." Olin, New Immigration Bill Opens Wrong Door,
Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 36, col. 3 (editorial) (criticism of S. 1611, 100th Cong., IstSess.
(1987), Sen. Kennedy's bill to reserve visas for "independent immigrants").
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982) (codifying Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79
Stat. 911, 911) ("immediate relatives" defined as "children, spouses, and parents."); see id. §
1101(a)(35), (b)(I)-(2) (definitions of "child," "spouse," and "parent").
9. Id. § 1153(a)(l)-(2), (4)-(5) (1982) (substantially codifying Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 912-13).
10. Id. § 1254(a)(1) (substantially codifying INA § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. at 214-15).
I1. Families composed of aliens and citizens have received special attention as "[tihe legisla-
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Derivative status is the fourth.1" This common immigration principle,
enjoyed by most alien families entitled to enter or remain in the United
States, grants to spouses and minor children the same immigration status as the family's principal applicant.
By requiring individual eligibility for legalization, IRCA denies derivative status to the families of legalized aliens, a fundamental differ-

ence in treatment between amnesty beneficiaries and other categories
of aliens. In addition, the absence of derivative status, among other
IRCA provisions,13 and relevant INS regulations, 4 like those requiring
tive history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress intended
to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping
families of United States citizens and immigrants united." HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., FACILITATING THE ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN ADOPTED CHILDREN, AND OTHER RELA-

UNITED STATES CITIZENS, H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2016, 2020.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (1982) (immigrants) (substantially codifying Act of Oct. 3, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 914 (adding INA § 203(a)(9))); id. § 1101(a)(15)(A),
(E)-(M) (nonimmigrants) (substantially codifying INA § 101(a)(15), 66 Stat. at 167-68).
13. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II), (iii) (West Supp. 1987) (exclusion of children who
received certain public welfare benefits); id. § 1255a(h) (five-year disqualification of newly legalized aliens from receiving certain public welfare assistance); id. § 1255a(a)(1)(C) (requisite identification of "living relatives" on application for temporary resident status). But see id. §
1255a(c)(4)-(5) (confidentiality of and limitation of access to information in applications for adjustment of status); Review of the Early Implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Review of the Early Implementation] (testimony of Rev. Msgr. Nicholas DiMarzio, Exec. Dir., Migration and Refugee Services, United States Catholic Conference) ("Although the law is clear on the confidentiality provisions, this provision is not so clear in the minds of the undocumented. Being able to give them
assurance that those with a dependent spouse and/or children will not be put in jeopardy is not an
easy thing to do."). Having shown continuous residence, see supra note 5, the applicant must then
successfully avoid any of 28 applicable exclusions. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d) (West Supp. 1987).
Apart from providing evidence of illegal residency, undocumented aliens must pay an application fee. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(c)(7) (West Supp. 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,193 (1987) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)). The application fees are $185 for each adult and $50 for each child
under 18. The maximum fee for a family (husband, wife, and any minor children) is $420. Id.
Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs) are authorized to charge each alien $75 for counseling
services, including "extensive interviewing, researching, documentation retrieval, translations or
in-depth counseling in the preparation of the application," and $25 for photographs and fingerprints. INS Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 6,232 (1987). QDEs are State, local, community, or voluntary
organizations that the Attorney General considers, by virtue of their experience, competent to
prepare and submit applications. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(c)(2) (West Supp. 1987). The INS Notice
includes a caveat: fees are subject to the approval of the INS; "fees must be nominal for the
applicant, not the designated entity"; and QDEs must inform all aliens they assist that the INS
requires only the application filing fees. 52 Fed. Reg. 6,232 (1987).
Gilbert Carrasco, Director of Immigration Services of the United States Catholic Conference,
recently put the fee schedules in practical context. If a family of five, (two parents, two children
and a grandparent) applies for legalization, they will pay $420 for the family and $185 for the
grandparent in application fees, between $60 and $75 per member for medical exams, and an
additional $35 if one member of the family is filing for a waiver of excludability.
TIVES OF

1957 U.S.

Even before you factor in the costs of legal assistance, time off work, notarization, copying, telephone, postage, and other costs associated with the application process, this family
would have spent over $1000 to apply for legalization.
Now consider further, if you will that the median family income of Hispanic families in
the United States in 1984 was $11,650. Assuming that our hypothetical family's annual
income is $13,900, this would mean that nearly 10 percent of their annual income would
have to be devoted to application for legalization.
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applicants to list the names and locations of all family members, discourage eligible undocumented aliens from applying for legalization by

reinforcing a fear that applying for legalization will not only result in
family separations, but will increase the risk of deportation by drawing
INS attention to the immigration status of ineligible family members.15
IRCA thus indicates a blunt disregard for the family unity of legal
temporary resident applicants' 6 and raises the question: Why is the
INS and the Budgetary Impact of Implementing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987) (statement of Gilbert Carrasco).
A recent bill sponsored by Senator Cranston provides that one half of the total application fees
be paid at the time the application is filed with the remainder due when the alien is first interviewed by an INS officer. S. 1225, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S6742-43 (daily ed.
May 19, 1987) (amending IRCA to permit installment payment of fees for legalization). In
presenting the legislation Cranston explained that the legalization fees are not comparable to
those charged for immigrant visas: the legalization fees only cover an adjustment to temporary
status; "[i]n contrast, the $185 fee charged for an immigrant visa results in a permanent resident
status for the applicant." 133 CONG. REC. S6740-41 (daily ed. May 19, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Cranston). Cranston argued that aliens seeking legalization will also incur the cost of medical
examinations, counseling fees, notary's fees, fingerprinting, and photographs. Installment payments, he asserted, will ease the financial burden for many minimum wage workers. Id. See generally Mugavero Assails High Fees for Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at D28, col. 4
(Bishop Francis Mugavero of the Brooklyn Diocese cites examples of exorbitant fees charged by
lawyers for legalization services).
14. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(2)). A mere
case-by-case determination whether family unity outweighs exclusion policy rests with the regional
and district directors in their discretion to waive applicable exclusions "in the case of individual
aliens for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public
interest." Specifically, the regulations provide that
[Tihe Service cannot use the regulatory process to substitute its judgment for that of Congress and grant the equivalent of derivative status through any existing mechanisms such
However, this is not a blanket prohibition against voluntary
as voluntary departure ....
departure. Instead, district directors will continue to [issue voluntary departure] in those
cases wherein it is determined that an ineligible family member has a humanitarian need
to remain in the United States.
52 Fed. Reg. 16,207 (1987) (key provisions of the Final Rule). But see S.J. Res. 131, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (calling for all INS district directors "to utilize their authority to provide
relief from deportation for ineligible family members, and work authorization where appropriate,
to assure family unity").
15. Immigration Amnesty Begins Smoothly But With Much Anxiety for Immigrants, Wall
St. J., May 6, 1987, at 66, col. 1. There is a strong cultural deterrent to applying for legalization.
Applicants must overcome an entrenched distrust of the INS, la migra. Id. (reporting attempts
"[t]o mollify immigrant distrust of the enforcement-minded la migra ... [by adorning] processing
centers nationwide with foot-tall replicas of Lady Liberty"). The INS use of former border patrol
agents, investigators, deportation officers, and other enforcement personnel at legalization centers
does not allay the fear. Border Officers to Weigh Pleas of Illegal Aliens: Some Fear that Agents
Will Show Hostility, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1987, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
The Chinese Confession Program, a Federal amnesty program during the 1950s for undocumented Chinese living in the United States, raised similar fears. See Chen, A Look Back at the
Chinese Confession Program, EAST/WEST NEWS, Apr. 23, 1987, at 1. The fears were wellfounded: Many who confessed were immediately placed in deportation proceedings for their professed sympathy for the People's Republic of China.
16. Senator Cranston, in support of S. 1408, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S13,727
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987) (amending IRCA to allow for absolute waiver of continuous residence
requirement for spouses and children of legalized aliens), observed that:
[W]e must not forget the purposes for which we included the legalization program in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. If this program is undermined due to the

19871

FAMILY UNIFICATION

family integrity of amnesty beneficiaries less valued than that of other
legal aliens? This article addresses the question by looking at IRCA

not as innovative immigration reform, but rather as part of a long tradition of Federal and State regulation of foreign, particularly Mexican,
labor.17 Congress sought through IRCA to regain control over legal immigration in part by eliminating the large population of aliens illegally
present in the United States.1 8 Legalization advances that goal by reclassifying-granting a legal status to--undocumented aliens who have
lived in the United States since 1981. A second IRCA goal was to ensure the availability of an agricultural work force, to be achieved in
part through a separate and less burdensome legalization program for
Special Agricultural Workers or SAWs. A comparison between the legalization requirements for long-term residents and for SAWs indicates

IRCA's preference for agricultural workers as new resident aliens.

9

But while contradicting national immigration policies favoring family
unity, IRCA's indifference to aliens as members of family groups replicates the historical disregard and disincentives directed at the families
of alien laborers.
IRCA's disregard for family unity of legalization applicants requires
an understanding of American immigration policies toward alien workers. Part I of this article therefore locates IRCA within an historical
lack of a national policy assuring family unity in the legalization process, we will continue
to have problems such as the straining of INS's limited resources for internal enforcement
purposes, the existence of an exploitable subclass of undocumented persons, and the unavailability of an adequate legal work force for employers. In short . . . our attempt to
immigration reform will amount to no reform at all, and we will continue to face the social,
legal, and economic problems which have plagued us in the past.
133 CONG. REC. S13,731 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987); see H.R. 3816, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(to extend for one year the application period under the legalization program). But see infra note
248 (rebuttal to S. 1408 by Sen. Simpson).
17. IRCA's preference for protecting certain sectors of the national economy rather than the
families of alien amnesty beneficiaries is an underlying theme of this article. For an historical
model of the relationship between economic and immigration policies, see K. CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924, at 3 (1984) ("Just as it was the
migrants' embodiment of labor power that was the impetus for these migrations, it was the economic needs of the system into which they were inserted that in large part determined immigration policies.").
18. See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND LEGALIZATION AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 45, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5649 (to accompany H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985))
(endorsing a "controlled legalization program for certain undocumented aliens who have entered
this country prior to 1982"). Upon signing IRCA, President Reagan described the legalization
program as one that "will go far to improve the lives of a class of individuals who now must hide
in the shadows, without access to many of the benefits of a free and open society." 22 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1534, 1534 (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5856-1, 5856-1.
19. Under the SAW program the application procedures, admissibility criteria, required
length of residence, proof of eligibility, benefit entitlements, travel restrictions, and adjustment to
permanent resident status are all more generous than the same provisions under the general amnesty for long-term residents. Compare 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a (West Supp. 1987) (general amnesty
for long-term res.........
; l 116 (SAW.
'.
amiisiy).
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context of the legal and social treatment of alien labor. From this perspective IRCA appears to perpetuate earlier policies that provided lowcost, low-maintenance foreign labor in part through the manipulation
of alien families. To clarify IRCA's particularly severe consequences
for undocumented families, Part I also describes the migrational, economic, and familial characteristics of Mexican undocumented families.
Part II examines the statutory and administrative provisions that impede undocumented families from remaining intact in the United
States. Part III assesses the extent to which amended legislation, existing administrative procedures, and international human rights agreements may remedy IRCA's deficiencies by permitting the immediate
relatives of legalized aliens to remain in the United States.
In analyzing the impact of IRCA on families, this article focuses
primarily on undocumented Mexican migrant families. This emphasis
is not because all undocumented families in the United States are either migrants 20 or Mexicans,21 but because to a large extent IRCA was
20. See, e.g., Papademetriou & DiMarzio, A Preliminary Profile of Unapprehended Undocumented Aliens in Northern New Jersey: A Research Note, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 746, 758
(1985) (clients of Catholic Community Service organizations in Northern New Jersey and New.
York City work primarily market-service and light-industry jobs); accord W. Cornelius, Potential
Impacts of New Federal Immigration Legislation on Immigrant-Dependent Firms and Industries
in California 2 [hereinafter Potential Impacts] (unpublished manuscript prepared for the annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Jan. 4, 1987) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal). Cornelius observed,
[Ilt is the non-agricultural sectors of the U.S. economy-and particularly, small businesses
in those sectors-that have the greatest' stake in continued access to Mexican and other
foreign-born labor, even though they are less well-organized and were much less politically
influential in the national debate over immigration policy than were the big agricultural
growers.
Id.
21. Simon, Nine Myths about Immigration, IMMIGR. J., July-Sept. 1985, at 3, 18 [hereinafter
Nine Myths]. But see Recent Developments, 65 Interp. Re]. 73, 74 (Jan. 25, 1988) ("Mexicans
account for more than 70 percent of amnesty applications so far."); THE LEGALIZATION COUNTDOWN, supra note 4, at xvi (reporting same). Statistical information about the numbers and nationalities of undocumented aliens has been both limited and inaccurate. The technical inability
and reluctance of the INS to track millions of aliens, the unwillingness of undocumented persons
to volunteer identification, the inaccuracy of nationality and gender figures extrapolated from
alien apprehensions, and studies based on non-random samples have resulted in only "best
guesses" and "conjectural estimates" to measure the undocumented population. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND

THE NATIONAL INTEREST app. E at 13, 34 (1981) [hereinafter SELECT COMM'N, STAFF REPORT]
(estimating that the "non-Mexican component of the illegally resident population makes up a
much larger share of the total number of illegals than commonly believed"); Briggs, Methods of
Analysis of Illegal Immigration into the United States, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 623, 638
(1984) (concluding that "[tlhe precise number is irrelevant if one concedes that the number of
persons involved is substantial and that the direction of change is toward annually increasing
numbers"); Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 19701981, 45 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROB. 223 (1982) (comprehensive review of popular methodology); Massey & Schnabel, Background and Characteristicsof Undocumented Hispanic Migrants
to the United States: A Review of Recent Research, II MIGRATION TODAY 6 (1983); Passel,
Undocumented Immigration, 487 ANNALS 181, 184-85 (1986) (distinguishing analytic from speculative estimates).
Yet figures exist. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1981) [hereinafter SELECT COMM'N.
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framed around the issue of Mexican agricultural workers. 2 Congressional debate over the undocumented Mexican population during
IRCA's development both guided and drew from public perceptions
about agricultural migrant workers and their families. These percep-

tions were based on current impressions about the numbers of undocumented aliens in the United States,23 on popular images of Mexican
characteristics and behavior, 4 and on stereotypes developed during the

Bracero Program, 1942-64, when single Mexican men provided a temporary agricultural work force.2 5 In discussing IRCA's content and

consequences for families, this article attempts to sort out perceptions
from facts, familial consequences from legal, and immigration policies

from economic.
FINAL REPORT] (endorsing the U.S. Census Bureau estimate that by 1978 three to six million
illegal aliens resided in the United States with Mexicans accounting for less than half the numbers). But see Passel, supra, at 187 (criticizing U.S. Bureau of Census methodology in 1980
census).
22. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1160-61 (West Supp. 1987) (general provisions relating to SAWs).
Grower demands for a continued agricultural labor force and Hispanic concerns about discrimination against Mexican-Americans blocked comprehensive immigration bills during several Congresses. CLAMOR AT THE GATES: THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 49-54, 67-69 (N. Glazer ed.
1985) [hereinafter CLAMOR AT THE GATES]; Potential Impacts, supra note 20, at 2 ("Until October, 1986, when the Simpson-Rodino bill was finally passed, efforts to pass a restrictive immigration bill in Congress had been hung up for more than two years because of squabbling over how to
provide agricultural employers with a steady supply of foreign labor.").
23. CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra note 22, at 22 (noting that before 1979, newspapers frequently reported "wild speculation" by government officials that 12 million illegal aliens were in
the United States).
24. Johnson, Compromise Immigration Plan Reflects a Shifting Image of Aliens, L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 21, 1986, § 1, at 4, col. 3. Interviewed during the 99th Congress, Representative Panetta
stated that

[T]he old Statue of Liberty-styled image of the alien humbly coming to this country for a
new start "is not the image Americans have today" of those crossing the southern borders.
Instead they are seen as "sneaking across the border and taking jobs from Americans,"
even if, as many admit, many of those jobs would go begging in this country without aliens
to fill them.
Id.
25. See Nine Myths, supra note 21, at 18 (concluding that "[jiust about all the individual
economic objections to immigrants are without factual foundation"). The Bracero Program was "a
legal temporary work program bringing Mexicans into the U.S., which had been developed during
the Second World War to deal with labor shortages." CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra note 22, at
53. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the Bracero Program
and its relevance to IRCA.
In 1973, Representative Latta favored the direct reinstitution of the Bracero Program as a
means of dealing with the undocumented family problem. Noting that since the Bracero Program
"we have had nothing but wetback trouble," he pointed out that
[u]nder the Bracero program we did not have the families of the Mexican people coming in
here. We only had male laborers. They went back to Mexico at the end of the harvest
season, and they came back the next year under contract. At that time we only were dealing with about 200,000 employees. We did not have the problem that we have today.
119 CONG. REC. 147180 (1973).
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MEXICAN MIGRATION AND FAMILY SETTLEMENT

Alien Labor

Congress learned a lesson from its 19th century experience with Chinese laborers, originally admitted into the country unconditionally, but
whose services in American industry were no longer needed by the mid1870s.2 6 Led by organized labor27 and supported with racist vigor in
the popular press, 8 Congress in the late 19th century passed a series of
laws restricting Chinese immigration and facilitating the deportation of
resident Chinese. 29 Early twentieth century statutes facilitating the domestic use of foreign labor sought to avoid the problem of alien laborers overstaying their economic usefulness by admitting workers into the
United States for the duration of the job only.
Many of these statutes specifically regulated Mexicans,"0 whose participation in American labor increased significantly after 1900, in part
as a result of a labor shortage caused by the exclusion of Chinese, in
part as a result of increased restrictions on European laborers. 3 ' In
1917, Congress for the first time exempted temporary Mexican migrants from restrictive immigration qualifications and authorized the
general admission of temporary contract laborers.32 From 1942 to
26. See G. BARTH, BITTER STRENGTH: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES,
1850-1870, at 129-56 (1974); S. MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN IMAGE
OF THE CHINESE, 1785-1882, at 195-201 (1969).
27. MILLER, supra note 26, at 195-98.
28. Id. at 145-66, 198-200.
29. See, e.g., An act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States, ch. 60,
27 Stat. 25 (1892), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. See generally Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (powerful criticism of judicial nurturance of Congress'
unlimited power to regulate immigration).
30. See generally IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS: PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICAN LABOR MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 136-48 (A. Corwin ed. 1978) (discussion of relaxation of immigration standards for border peoples); Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a
Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 655-66 (1981) (discussion of Federal
law at the turn of the century).
Unfortunately for immigration control, tapping a surplus labor pool in a poverty-stricken
border country has always proved much easier than shutting off the flow. During the fouryear period of departmental exceptions [from exclusion provisions 1917-21], more than
72,000 Mexican peons were legally admitted to work primarily as unskilled contract labor
on railroads and agriculture. No one knows how many thousands of workers crossed illegally during this period, many of them excited by the reports of.high wartime wages and
encouraged by the example of temporary exemptions.
IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS,

supra, at 141 (citation omitted).

CALAVITA, supra note 17, at 160; A. SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND
THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 178 (1971) (noting that the completion of the

31.

Southern Pacific railroad network to Mexico assured business interests of a new source of laborMexicans).
32. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 2, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (exempting from an $8 head tax
individuals entering the United States "for a temporary stay" after an uninterrupted residence of
one year in the Republic of Mexico), repealed by INA, ch. 477, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279
(1952); id. § 3,39 Stat. at 875-78 (ninth proviso) (authorizing the Commissioner of Immigration
and the Secretary of Labor "to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inad-
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1964, Mexican agricultural workers were admitted under the Bracero
Program, a Federal scheme of private, temporary contracts. 3 In 1952,
Congress instituted the H-2 program, which continues to provide for
the admission of temporary laborers. 4 These statutes were tooled to fit
American labor needs. During domestic labor shortages alien laborers
were admitted into the United States. When the troops returned, the
crops were in, or the economy was down, they were sent back, often in
official "wetback drives." 35
In addition, the statutes were structured to satisfy another employer
desire: the preference for men-and, ideally, men unaccompanied by

families. 8
missible aliens applying for temporary admission"), repealed by INA, ch. 477, § 403(a)(13), 66
Stat. 163, 279 (1952); ANN. REP. OF COMM'R GEN. OF IMMIGR. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1918, at
15-16 (authorizing the importation of 30,000 Mexican nationals to work in agriculture and industry as part of the war effort).
33. See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1951, ch. 223, § 501, 65 Stat. 119, 119 (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to recruit Mexican workers, to operate reception areas "while arrangements are
being made for their employment," to transport the workers over the border, to assist workers and
employers "in negotiating contracts for agricultural employment," and "to guarantee the performance by employers of provisions of such contracts relating to the payment of wages or the furnishing of transportation"). See generally Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico."An HistoricalPerspective, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 66 (1975) (examining historical antecedents of
"illegal" alien problem).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1I01(a)(15)(H) (1982), amended by 8 U.S.C.A. § II01(a)(15)(H)(a)-(b)
(West Supp. 1987) (IRCA providing for a new category of temporary agricultural worker).
35. See Scruggs, Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942, 34 AGRICULTURAL HIST. 140, 142 (1960) (describing how World War 11 changed a labor surplus to a
shortage); Wetbacks, Cotton, and Korea, 172 THE NATION 408, 408 (1951) (remarking on the
fluctuations of the " 'wetback' invasion" following the Korean War). The easy removal of Mexicans, in comparison with other "common labor alternatives" served social as well as economic
purposes.
The Mexican is closer [to] home and can, and does, return there sooner or later in large
numbers, whereas the task of returning negroes is much greater and almost impossible in
the case of Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
The American negro, the Porto Rican negro and the Filipinos cannot be deported if they
prove later to be a crime menace. The Mexican can be. It seems to us, therefore, that
beyond question the Mexican is the safest source of common labor ....
R. Taylor, Mexican vs. American Farm Labor 16 (1929) (unpublished address delivered by Exec.
Sec. of California Agricultural Legislative Comm. at Ogden, Utah) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal).
The benefits of temporary admission were restated in 1973 by Representative Latta, who supported reinstatement of the Bracero Program. "We could have an agreement with the Government
of Mexico, and we could have an orderly process once more where we could import the help that
we need, and when the help was no longer needed, they would return to Mexico." 119 CONG. REC.
14,180 (1973).
36. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581 (1889) (citing the advantage to employers-and concomitant disadvantage to native workers-of hiring single men from China). The Court stated that
Not being accompanied by families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small;
and they were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and
artisans. The competition between them and our people was for this reason altogether in
their favor . . . to the great disturbance of the public peace.
Id. at 595; BARTH, supra note 26, at 212. During the Bracero Program, "housing policy was
bound to reflect a preference for Mexicans, who could be economically lodged in barracks." E.
GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORy; AN ACCOUNT OF THE MAN-
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After 1951, under the Bracero Program, Congress expressly limited

the entry of temporary workers to men, 37 preferred for most agricultural labor because of their physical durability. Mexican men were considered especially suitable for stoop work. As the California Packers
Association explained in 1964: "Eyes to the ground and backs bent,
braceros cut asparagus under a broiling sun. It's a tough job which few
people are willing or able to do." ' 8 Temporary admissions statutes increased the likelihood of attracting men without families, as workers
were deterred from uprooting their families on short-term, cyclical ba-

ses."9 The exclusion of families was most effective during the Bracero
Program, which, because of its longevity, created an enduring stereo-

type of Mexican laborers: compliant, hardworking, single men."'
While the Bracero Program authorized the legal entry of Mexican
OF MEXICAN FARM WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA, 1942-1960, at 212 (1964)
(describing the increasing unavailability of domestic migrant family housing from 1952 to 1960:
"[Als the facilities for domestics became scarcer requests for braceros increased").
37. Compare Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, § 2(a), 57 Stat. 70, 70 (authorizing the States to
spend designated Federal money to provide "an adequate supply of workers for the production and
harvesting of agricultural commodities essential to the prosecution of the war," and for the "transportation, supervision, and subsistence" of "such workers and their families and necessary personal property") with Act of July 12, 1951, ch. 223, § 501, 65 Stat. 119, 119 (no provision for the
families of workers from Mexico).
"Men" often included boys. See Scruggs, supra note 35, at 145 (noting that in May 1942, the
California Field Corps was given emergency permission to "import 300 Mexican males, sixteen
years or older" to work sugar beet fields).
38. The Bracero: What Happens After He's Gone, DEL MONTE SHIELD, Aug. 1964, at 3
(trade magazine of the California Packers Association) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal). The California Packers Association in 1964 argued for an extension of the
Bracero Program: "Why don't domestic workers take a field job? Simply because most of them
are not prepared to cope with hot, hard work." Id. at 5. Reisler, Always the Laborer, Never the
Citizen: Anglo Perceptions of the Mexican Immigrant During the 1920s, 45 PAC. HIST. REV. 231,
233-34 (1976) (quoting 1908 BULLETIN OF BUREAU OF LABOR, MEXICAN LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES, stating that "[t]he Mexican is docile, patient, usually orderly in camp, fairly intelligent
under competent supervision, obedient, and cheap").
Docility was recently put forth as a reason to exclude certain nationalities. "Neither can we
accept immigrants who will constitute a servile class, a class of permanently unequal people such
as exists in many countries around the world." Zucker, The Haitians versus the United States:
The Courts as a Last Resort, 467 ANNALS 151, 154 (1983) (1982 statement by Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams).
39. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MIGRANT WORKERS No. 2, THE
SOCIAL SITUATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, at 20, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/189
(1986) (comparing restrictions in different regions of the world on the migration of migrant workers' families).
40. See DEL MONTE SHIELD, supra note 38, at 1; Reisler, supra note 38, at 233, 234. The
Bracero Program fostered the belief that laborers traveled north to seize and then to keep the
better life. Professor Gerald P. Lopez has characterized this belief, or model of migration, as
"long-term aspiration." Lopez, supra note 30, at 624-25. Lopez explains that the aspirational
theory is derived from what he terms "the informed consensus," or more simply an "American
point of view," regarding undocumented aliens. Id. Lopez suggests, however, that Mexican migration results not so much from a work force aspiring to an elevated income, but from active employer recruitment and complementary immigration laws lightly enforced. Id. at 651-55. As workers began to migrate seasonally, they and their families came to rely upon and incorporate
temporary migration into their household economies, an alternative model of migration that Lopez
calls the "reliant theory." The aspirational model thus focuses on America as the land of opportunity; the reliant model recognizes the complementary American opportunism. Id. at 686-91.
AGED MIGRATION
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men for temporary agricultural work, it did not stem, and to some extent renewed, a contemporaneous flow of illegal migrant workers into
the United States. Many employers decided that any disadvantages of
employing illegal aliens were outweighed by the costs of complying
with the official Bracero contracts, which required minimum standards
for housing, salaries, and working conditions." Thus, during the
Bracero Program, and in increasing numbers thereafter, many undocumented Mexican workers joined the American labor force.4 2 The Texas
Proviso to the INA contributed to the influx by establishing a double
standard: by removing "employment" from the definition of "harboring," the Texas Proviso provided official encouragement to employer
hiring practices by removing even the threat of sanctions. 3
Although their presence in agriculture and industry was sought by
employers, encouraged by Federal immigration law, and facilitated by
easy-going border enforcement, undocumented Mexicans were otherwise unwelcome in American society. Vocabulary both popular and official set the tone. IRCA had not yet introduced the term "unauthorized aliens" ;44 seasonal Mexican laborers were still "wetbacks," who
were viewed as taking jobs from Americans,4 5 subverting the govern41. H. ANDERSON, THE BRACERO PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA 65 (1976) (noting that Bracero
Program contracts were enforced by "'friendly persuasion' rather than strict insistence on the
letter of the law and all its sanctions."); see E. GALARZA, STRANGERS IN OUR FIELDS 65 (1956)
[hereinafter GALARZA, STRANGERS].
42. See Reichert & Massey, History and Trends in U.S. Bound Migrationfrom a Mexican
Town, 14 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 475, 479 (1980).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1982) (INA, ch. 477, § 274(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 228-29) ("Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section [punishing the harboring of an alien], employment . . . shall not be deemed to constitute harboring"), repealed by 8 U.S.C.A. §
1324a(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1987) (making employment of unauthorized aliens unlawful); see
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No.
115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 76 (1983) (to accompany H.R. 1510) (The bill "[elliminates the socalled 'Texas proviso', which prevents employment from being considered as an element of harboring an alien.").
44. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(3) (West Supp. 1987). The statute provides that "the term 'unauthorized alien' means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the
alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B)
authorized to be so employed by [IRCA] or by the Attorney General." Id.
45. See Reisler, supra note 38, at 246-51 (review of the fight between nativists seeking to
restrict Mexican immigration during the 1920s and employer groups favoring unrestricted immigration). Nativists argued that the low wages acceptable to Mexicans, content with poverty because of their cultural and racial traits, would cause the displacement of American factory and
construction workers. Id. at 247. Growers conceded the basic characterization of Mexicans, but
contended that if Congress restricted Mexican immigration, employers would have to turn to even
less desirable groups such as blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Filipinos. Id. at 251.
Mexicans were also seen as threatening not only the industrial labor force but also the family
farm: "[A] continued influx of Mexican laborers . . . would bring about the perpetuation of a
plantation type agricultural system in the Southwest," id. at 246, because "the backward, thriftless and unintelligent races succeed best when employed in gangs on large estates. The cotton and
sugar fields of the South have their counterparts in the . . . new developed sugar-beet fields of
Nebraska, Colorado, and California, with their Russians, Bohemians, Japanese, and Mexicans." J.
COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA 132 (1908).
Undocumented workers have also been accused of displacing Americans in their communities,
as well as in their iobs, by forcing migration of domesiic labor to areas "beyond the Wetback
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ment," jeopardizing the public health,4 7 thwarting unionization,4 8 and
increasing the crime rates.4 9
Each of these earlier objections has a modern counterpart. Taking
jobs away from Americans remains a central concern for those favoring
restrictions on immigration.5" Subversion nowadays is attributed not so
much to communism or anarchism,5 1 but to cultural separatism.5 2 The
belt." Note, Wetbacks: Can the States Act to Curb Illegal Entry?, 6 STAN. L. REV. 287, 289
(1954).
46. See, e.g., Todd, Labor's Viewpoint on Mexican Nationals and "Wetbacks," 16 THE COMMONWEALTH 164, 164 (1953). "They depress wages, and they also produce a Communistic infiltration. There are unquestionably a number of Communistic agents who day by day, month by
month, and year by year infiltrate into the United States by crawling over a fence, swimming a
river or merely walking across the border .... It is a danger to us." Id.
47. See, e.g., CALIF. STATE DEP'T PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CONDITIONS AND SERVICES FOR
DOMESTIC SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES IN CALIFORNIA

17-18 (Oct.

1, 1960) (quoting Memorandum from M. Larive, Manager, Firebaugh labor camp). The camp
manager of a farm labor camp in California attributed the substandard living conditions of migrant children to their "[Ihack of knowledge as well as appreciation for health and moral standards." Id. at 17. The camp manager had also recorded that the nearest ambulance was 45 miles
away. Id.
48. See Bustamante, Structural and Ideological Conditions of the Mexican Undocumented

Immigration to the United States, 19 AM.

BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

364, 370 (1976). Trade union

demands for restrictions on immigration were instrumental in "preventing the growth of workers'
class consciousness, i.e. an alliance of old and new immigrants." Id.
Fear of unionization was sometimes at odds with improvement of conditions in migrant camps.
In the late 1930s the Federal Farm Security Administration operated a small demonstration chain
of migrant camps. Militant employers opposed such camps on the grounds that employees were
more likely to unionize in government camps than in those on employer land and under the employer's immediate control. Taylor, Migratory Agricultural Workers on the Pacific Coast, 3 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV.

225, 228-29 (1938).

A link was often made between unionism and subversion. Taylor reported that "[w]hile there
were few outbreaks [of strikes] in 1937, the growers report 'agitators' in the field, are apprehensive, and are organized from Arizona to Washington ...ready to 'fight the subversive activities of
the Communists and their allies,' including the C.I.O." Id.
A second link was between unionism and racism. "By internalizing the ideology of ethnic superiority, which originated in the class interests of owners of capital, trade unions here perpetuated a
system that exploited the immigrant." Bustamante, supra, at 370. Bustamante points out that
Irish, Chinese, and finally Mexican workers were welcomed as workers and then assigned an inferior status in the social structure. As Calavita concluded, "Mexican workers-both documented
and undocumented-are simultaneously scapegoated, exploited by capital, and resented by American labor, much like earlier immigration from across the Atlantic." CALAVITA, supra note 17, at
160.

49. See H. KITANO,

RACE RELATIONS

242-46 (1976) (discussing 1943 "Zoot-suit" riots in Los

Angeles as an example of popular acceptance of a link between Mexican ethnicity and crime);
Reisler, supra note 38, at 245 (reviewing nativist arguments that Mexican genetic unappreciation

of cleanliness and decency "contribute greatly to crime"). But see

IMMIGRANTS-AND

IMMI-

supra note , at 293 (noting that "[m]ost of the crime associated with Mexican aliens has
always been a by-product of a rampant, predatory, and degrading wetback business mainly concentrated in the dismal slum areas along the notorious Anglo-Mexican frontier").
50. But see Passel, supra note 21, at 195.
51. But see Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1987) (tracing American xenophobia from its colonial inception to its current expression in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952). Some blame communism for causing illegal immigration. See GOP Legislators Urge Resolution Backing the Contras, S.F. Chron., July 17, 1987,
at 21, col. 6. In July 1987, California Republican State legislators introduced a resolution in
support of the Nicaraguan Contras. State Senator John Doolittle stated in its support: "What's
going on in Nicaragua is important to us here in California particularly because we already have
a tremendous problem posed with illegal immigrants crossing our borders" who are being driven
north by the "Marxist-Leninist government in Nicaragua." Id.
GRANTS,
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perceived threat to public health now includes AIDS, recently added to
list of contagious diseases for which aliens are excludable. 53 The issue
of unionization has grown more complex as new conflicts between Mexican-Americans and undocumented workers, and between undocumented workers and Mexican border commuters, increase the longstanding tension between American and foreign labor. 4
B.

Opposition to Undocumented Families

While undocumented Mexicans have been young, single, relatively
uneducated men, 5 recent studies indicate a significant variation in the
undocumented profile: the arrival of a substantial number of families-"men and women in the young labor force ages accompanied to
this country by a significant number of their minor dependents."" Immigration policies toward Mexican labor continue to misconceive and
devalue the importance of the family to the Mexican worker.
The relationship between the worker here and the family there is
sometimes taken as evidence that, but for his sending money home, the
Mexican worker has essentially abandoned his family; in fact, however,
52. In 1978 former CIA Director William Colby warned that the spill-over effects of Mexican
population growth posed a threat to national security greater even than that posed by the Soviet
Union. Colby defined national security as "the capacity to protect the individual and collective
welfare and identity of U.S. citizens." W. CORNELIUS, AMERICA IN THE ERA OF LIMITS: NATIVIST
REACTIONS TO THE "NEW" IMMIGRATION 27 (1982).
53. 52 Fed. Reg. 21,532 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 534). Public health experts have
opposed the testing of immigrants because quarantine measures have generally been ineffective in
preventing the spread of disease, because the requirement will very likely generate a black market
in false test certificates, and because the potential for mass retaliation from other countries is
great. Testing Immigrants for AIDS Assailed, S.F. Chron., July 16, 1987, at 18, col. I.
54. G. SANCHEZ & J. RoMo, ORGANIZING MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED FARM WORKERS ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER 1-2 (1981). But see Potential Impacts, supra note 20, at 4.
In those firms that are unionized, union leaders increasingly help employers to rationalize
and protect the firm's continued access to immigrant labor. Union representatives often
told us that, after an INS raid, their main function is to make sure that the apprehended
workers are eventually reinstated in their jobs, and to help them keep their seniority. In
this and many other ways, the union movement in California seems to have come to terms
with the Mexicanization of the work force ....
Id.
55. Massey & Schnabel, supra note 21, at 10; Tienda, Familism and Structural Assimilation
of Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 14 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 383, 393 (1980). Statistics showing that most undocumented aliens are single men at first suggest a population of "illegal" bachelors, independent and unattached. The image is inaccurate on several counts. First, the
number of women and children migrating from Mexico has increased greatly. See Reichert &
Massey, supra note 42, at 482. A study of migration from one rural Mexican town revealed that
while no women, documented or undocumented, migrated between 1960 and 1964, by 1978, 47%
of townsfolk leaving for the U.S. illegally were women. Id. Similarly, 7% of migrants between
1960 and 1964 were children; by 1978, undocumented children constituted 23% of migrants. Id.
Second, Mexican migration prior to the Bracero Program may also have been less male-dominated than had been thought. Kinship migration patterns, developing since the 1920s, were disrupted by the Bracero Program. Id. at 479. It is also very likely true that many aliens in detention
who claim to be single are in fact married and are reluctant to disclose information about family
members.
56. Massey & Schnabel, sunra note 21, at 10.
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temporary migration of the head of a rural Mexican household has become "an integral part of economic strategies in households throughout
[western Mexico]. ' 5 While workers unaccompanied by families may

not appear to be part of a continuing family relationship from an
American perspective, the workers' integral place in family and community is clearly recognized in Mexico. 5 Thus, IRCA's failure to ensure the unity of the undocumented family may derive in part from a
popularly accepted and inaccurate notion that the family attachments
of many Mexican workers are either nonexistent or insignificant.
Opposition to the presence of families of foreign workers has traditionally included all the charges against the workers in general in addi-

tion to specific objections based on family characteristics. The first and
perhaps most steadfast objection to undocumented families concerns

numbers. Inclusion of family members not only increases the number of
foreigners immediately present; their inclusion also portends population

expansion as the foreigners petition for relatives within the immigration
system as well as bear children. Mexican families have been particularly disfavored because of their "infinite powers of multiplication." 59
Second, alien families are thought to cost money: While single male
workers are a relatively cheap date for American society, family members are not. Alien dependents are often perceived as draining local
social service resources. 60
57. Massey, The Social Organization of Mexican Migration to the United States, 487 ANNALS 102, 103 (1986). Men migrated not only because their labor was most valuable in the
United States, or because they were recruited by American employers, but because it was their
duty within the family to accept wage-labor migration as a more profitable form of earning income. Lopez, supra note 30, at 679-86.
58. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 57, at 102. One rural Mexican town has transformed the
fiesta day in honor of the town's patron saint into a celebration of the return of los ausentes, the
absent ones or migrants. "By sponsoring the periodic reunion of los ausentes and nonimmigrant
paisanos, the fiesta facilitates the reintegration of the former into the community and reaffirms
their continuing place in social life by providing a very public demonstration of the community's
commitment to them as true paisanos." Id.
59. Reisler, supra note 38, at 243 n.47. But see CORNELIUS, supra note 52, at 34 (noting that
the average undocumented family in a sample had only two children and "[for whatever reasons.
. . have adopted the fertility pattern of the host society with astonishing rapidity"). See generally
Hispanic Population Growing 5 Times as Fast as Rest of U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at
Al, col. 4 (high fertility rates among the Hispanic population are only partly responsible for the
growth; undocumented aliens account for 23% of the increase since 1980).
The fertility of immigrants has been a component in immigration policy determinations for
several reasons: the cost to society of children, the ability to project the size of a future adult
population, the view that having too many children symptomized personal sloth and "primitivism," and worries about American racial composition and cultural homogeneity. Simon, Basic
Data Concerning Immigration into the United States, 487 ANNALS 12, 50 (1986).
60. See, e.g., Note, supra note 45, at 292 ("The Wetback not only drains the community of its
wage dollar, but also imposes a substantial burden on the financial resources of its health, welfare,
and law enforcement agencies."). But see Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public
Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63, 66 (1977). Fogel notes that "although the public
at large is apparently concerned with the costs of social welfare services used by illegal aliens,
most people who have studied the matter tend to agree that the direct social welfare costs of
illegal aliens are slight."
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Third, racial and class-based prejudices often result in objections to
the integration of laborers' families into the locality. The families of
foreign workers in the United States are often poorer than the folk
living in the communities where they settle. While the access of single
agricultural workers to local society was often limited by restrictions
related to their schedules, housing, 6 ' and transportation, 2 families are
under less control and, despite segregation in housing, 8 education,"'
and commerce, 5 appear more frequently in the community.6"

The potential integration of migrant families puts the locality at risk
in at least two ways. First, because migrants have often lived in substandard conditions,6 7 public health concerns are sometimes raised.6 8
Second, integration risks permanence: migrant families might want to
stay, thus increasing the potential burden on public assistance. Com-

munities have always understood the danger of neighborliness."
Finally, because families tend to make residence a more permanent
61. GALARZA, STRANGERS, supra note 41, at 20 (Access to migrant camps was controlled by
the owners who often required passes provided by management to enter).
62. See ANDERSON, supra note 41, at 126 (discussing Standard Work Contract guarantee of
the laborer's right to purchase goods in places of his or her own choice); id. at 126-27 (employers
often charged laborers for transportation, or provided free transportation if purchases were made
at specified places).
63. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, STATE OF MICHIGAN, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
THE STATUS OF MIGRATORY FARM LABOR IN MICHIGAN 9 (1968) [hereinafter MICHIGAN REPORT] (reporting that migrants could not receive visitors at migrant housing because growers insisted on their right to screen visitors coming upon the growers' private property).
64. Taylor, supra note 35, at 227 (children in school were often segregated). In many cases,
migrant children did not attend school because of the transient nature of their schedules or lack of
information about school availability, or because of their exclusion from local school through custom or law.
65. See, e.g., NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA I Il (R.
Olmsted & C. Wollenberg eds. 1971). During the 1940s, Chicanos from McCarney, Texas had
"to travel forty-five miles to Fort Stockton for a haircut because Anglo barbers would not cut
Chicano hair and Chicanos could not legally become barbers in McCarney." Id.
66. See, e.g., G. HILL, TEXAS-MEXICAN MIGRATORY AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN WISCONSIN
14 (1948).

Undoubtedly [many] a resident of Kenosha, Racine, Fond du Lac, Sturgeon Bay ...and
Waukesha turned around more than once to look at the Mexican family groups whom they
passed on the streets of their cities during the summer of 1947. In some smaller localities.
. local residents must have thought their towns were taken over completely by these strangers, especially on Saturday afternoons and evenings.
Id. The perception of inundation may have overtaken the reality: only one-third of the Mexicans
interviewed went into town frequently as most had no transportation. Id. In fact, "isolation was a
constant source of complaint in the [immigrant] camps visited." Id.
67. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("According to our estimate, one-third of the [family] housing .. .was
classified undesirable and unfit for human occupancy."); MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 63, at 22
(noting that "[m]igrant families live in sub-slum housing, receive substandard services, and are
excluded from the protection of laws, which protect all other citizens").
68. See, e.g., Note, supra note 45, at 290-91 (noting that the "Idleath and disease rates in the
areas of high Wetback concentration assume more the characteristics of Mexico than of the
United States").
69. See, e.g., MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 63, at 15 (noting that "'[the implication is
clear that rural people in Michigan believe that there can be no economic or social relief for farm
worker . ithut some saciice u tie part of the employers or the resident community' ").
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enterprise7" they increase the political capabilities of immigrant groups.
Temporary aliens, legal or illegal, have no direct political power. 7 Five
years after acquiring permanent resident status, however, aliens may
become naturalized and vote. 7 2 Their potential for permanence thus excites those political organizations anxious to cultivate eventual citizens 73 and troubles those following the enduring political tradition of

American nativism.74
While these factors help explain restrictionist policies regarding the
families of authorized temporary workers, the policy rhetoric contains
an additional, moralistic element relating to the families of undocumented aliens. 75 Extending amnesty to unqualified persons, even
spouses and children, who have broken the law grates on a national
sense of fairness. 71 Opponents of the legalization program have consistently defended limiting its scope, in part out of a conception of order
and due.7 7 However, punishing the alien workers for the existence of an
70. Reichert & Massey, supra note 42, at 488-89 ("While it is possible that entire families of
legal migrants may continue to shuttle back and forth between the United States and Mexico, the
presence of additional family members acts as an impediment to seasonal migration. Sheer numbers make recurrent movement more difficult and complicated.").
71. See NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL, supra note 65, at 101-02 (noting that Chicanos'
political development may have been inhibited through an internal acceptance of the dominant
culture's racist stereotypes). Because undocumented aliens are included within a state's population
for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives, it has been argued that they
exercise indirect political influence by "dilut[ing] the voting power of citizens in states without a
significant illegal population." Note, A TerritorialApproach to Representationfor Illegal Aliens,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1342, 1344 (1982) (discussing an unsuccessful suit brought by Federation for
American Immigration Reform to enjoin the United States Census Bureau from including undocumented aliens).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982).
73. See Pachon, An Overview of Citizenship in the Hispanic Community, 21 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 299, 304 (1987) (describing the Citizenship Project of the National Association of
Latino Elected Officials and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Education Fund); see also J. MOORE
& H. PACHON. HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (1985) (noting that "[w]hile the majority
of the Chicano population traditionally votes Democratic," the appeal of "Republican conservatism and an emphasis on family moral values and self-reliance" may make the Mexican community an important swing vote).
74. See J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925,
at 30-31 (2d ed. 1967). One recently stated goal of the Federation for American Immigration
Reform is to: "Lobby Congress to repeal the Special Agricultural Worker Amendment that virtually gives away citizenship to anyone working in the fields for a mere three months." FAIR Open
Letter (undated) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal).
75. Opposing the proposed extension of the legalization program beyond May 1988, Patrick
Burns, Assistant Dir., Federation for American Immigration Reform, stated: "Instead of being
thanked for an act of beneficence . . .we're hearing the whining of the ungrateful. . . . They'll
be damned lucky if amnesty isn't repealed altogether if they push this too far." Amnesty Requests
by Aliens Decline, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, § I, at 12, col. 2.
76. Representative Davis stated that: "[A]mnesty tells the world that the way to get into
America is to break the law, cheat and come here because then you can get permanent residence
and then you become a citizen. Mr. Chairman, in my view what amnesty does is cheapen the
value of American citizenship." 132 CONG. REC. H9727 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
77. Senator Helms stated that: "[Almnesty for millions of illegal aliens-for millions of conscious law breakers-would show our citizens and indeed the world, that our great country cannot
muster the will necessary to enforce our own very generous immigration laws." 128 CONG. REC.
20,857 (1982).
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undocumented population ignores the long complicity of the United
States in recruiting and facilitating the entry of an illegal alien

workforce. 7" Punishing their children by refusing to accord them derivative status is worse.7 9 It is no surprise that implementation of IRCA's

individual eligibility requirements results in the convenient and historically familiar consequence: the restoration of an alien work force composed of single men.
C.

Characteristicsof the Undocumented Family

IRCA's failure to treat families as a unit is particularly harsh in
light of the demographic and sociological characteristics of the Mexican undocumented family.8 0 Three characteristics-patterns of kinship
migration, economic interdependence, and the emotional support function of the family-are central to understanding the consequences of
IRCA on this population.
Kinship networks have been integral to the development of Mexican
migration in the twentieth century. Workers recruited by agricultural
or railroad interests around 1900 in turn recruited relatives and friends
from their home villages. Family and village based networks continued
during and after the period of the Bracero Program, as contracts initially arranged through governmental offices were bypassed by direct
contacts between growers and the relatives and friends of early
braceros. 81

In addition to facilitating job placement and the trip north, the family validated and incorporated migration into an acceptable and expected tradition, a "common event in the family life cycle." 82 Male
78. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
79. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (identifying undocumented children as "a
discrete group of innocent children"); cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
175 (1972) (dictum) (Louisiana worker's compensation law that denied recovery to illegitimate
children of decedent workman violates equal protection clause). Justice Powell noted that
"[o]bviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitmate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent." Id.
80. As participants in the migration process undocumented families are in transition. Despite
longstanding assumptions and stereotypes about Mexicans, first generation migrant families differ
both from families in Mexico and from second generation Chicano families. Further, rural Mexican families differ from urban Mexican families and both migrate to the United States. Potential
Impacts, supra note 20, at 4-5. Accordingly, after resettlement "Itlhere is no one Chicano family
but a number of family types that may vary according to region, duration of residence in the
United States, education, social class, age, and urban-rural place of residence." A. MIRANDt & E.
ENRIQUEZ, LA CHICANA: THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMAN 111 (1979) [hereinafter LA
CHICANA1.
Because of the diversity and transitional nature of undocumented Mexican families, this article
qualifies its discussion of Mexican familial characteristics with a limitation noted by Mirand6 and
Enriquez: "The characteristics we attribute to the Chicano family are not true of all families, but
they are more likely to characterize the Chicano than the Anglo family." Id. at
81. Massey, supra note 57, at 106-07.
82. Id. at 103. In a study of four rural Mexican communities with well developed migration
networks, no one whn migrated before !940 had a migrant parcnt. Of those who migrated during

312

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:295

relatives-uncles and nephews, brothers, male cousins, and particularly
fathers and sons-tend to migrate together, even after they have
formed their own families.8 3 A pattern of women in migration has also
emerged. In many cases married women and older children8 4 follow a
male head of household who sends for them after establishing some
degree of security.85
Kinship ties also sustain the family economically. The Mexican migrant family has historically relied on the labor of all capable family
members to contribute to the family income. Studies of Mexican labor
patterns in nearly every decade of the twentieth century indicate that
in both cities and rural areas, women and children commonly worked
to supplement the father's income." 6 In farm families, women and children often worked with men in the fields, although they systematically
earned less than men87 and their wages were paid in a lump sum to the
male head of household. 8 Neither child labor laws, enforced with a
selective lack of vigor against agricultural employers who hired migrant
children,8 9 nor compulsory school attendance" provided much protecthe Bracero Program, from 1940 to 1964, 25.7% had a migrant parent; and of those who migrated
between 1965 and 1980, 52.9% had a migrant parent and 11.2% had a migrant grandparent. Id.
at 108.
83. Id. at 104. Teenage sons of widowed women sometimes migrate north in order to support
their mothers and siblings in the father's stead. Reichert & Massey, supra note 42, at 484.
84. Younger children tend to remain in Mexico, often cared for by grandparents, until the
familial base in the United States is more established. Single as well as married mothers have left
infants in the care of relatives in order to migrate north. Reichert & Massey, supra note 42, at
484.
85. Simon & Deley, The Work Experience of Undocumented Mexican Women Migrants in
Los Angeles, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1212, 1226 (1984) (Table 6: Reasons for Coming to the
United States by Legal Status) (noting that in a 1981-82 study of undocumented Mexican migrant women in Los Angeles, 45.8% listed "[flamily unity . . . to accompany or join another
member or members of my family" as a "Very Important" reason for their coming to the United
States).
86. M. GARCIA, DESERT IMMIGRANTS: THE MEXICANS OF EL PASO, 1880-1920, at 74-79
(1981) (describing the employment patterns of Mexican settlers in El Paso between 1900 and
1920: "Because entire families . . . had arrived from Mexico, many females, especially daughters
or other young female relatives, had to find work to augment the earnings of the men."); E.
GUTIERREZ & H. LUJAN, THE KANSAS MIGRANT SURVEY: AN INTERPRETIVE PROFILE OF THE
MEXICAN-AMERICAN MIGRANT FAMILY 21-25 (1973) [hereinafter KANSAS MIGRANT SURVEY].
"Because of the low wages paid, as many as possible must work to keep the family economically
viable." Id. at 22; HILL, supra note 66, at 11 (noting that "[tlhe number of workers per family
ranged from one to ten, the average number being five per family."); S. MENEFEE, MEXICAN
MIGRATORY WORKERS OF SOUTH TEXAS 40 (1941) (describing migrant families as "consisting of
8 to 18 persons, with 5 to 12 workers per family").
87. Kossoudji & Ranney, The Labor Market Experience of Female Migrants: The Case of
Temporary Mexican Migration to the U.S., 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1120, 1121 (1984).
88. The practice of paying agricultural families as a group has continued to the present, creating problems of proof for family members attempting to qualify for legalization on the basis of
their performance of seasonal agricultural services, but who have no individual record of payment.
Telephone interview with Ilene Gusfield, Assistant Regional Legalization Director, United States
Catholic Conference, San Francisco (Sept. 2, 1987).
89. KANSAS MIGRANT SURVEY, supra note 86, at 16 ("[W]hen an entire family is contracted
and travels as a unit the law tends to be overlooked.").
90. See HILL, supra note 66, at 12, 14. Hill noted that
Naturally, education in a group having no roots in a permanent community, is a haphaz-
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tion to undocumented children. The increased availability of education
following the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe9 1 and the gradual introduction of bilingual instruction following the Bilingual Education Act,9 2 have reduced the number of undocumented children in the
work force. It remains common, however, for both parents to work.93

Finally, the most significant characteristic of the Chicano family has
been identified as familism, "the values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with the Mexican-American extended family." 94 A com-

parison of Anglo-American and Mexican-American extended families
suggests the special primacy of the family to Mexican-Americans." 5
Mexican-Americans are more likely than Anglo-Americans to have relatives living nearby and are more likely to rely on relatives for emotional support "regardless of their geographic accessibility." ' Both
children 97 and the aged9 also view their families as a primary source of
emotional support.
ard affair.
Most of the families were more or less familiar with the principles of compulsory education and child labor regulations. Coming, however, from a background where poverty and
downright hunger have made even the meagre earnings of child labor necessary, they cannot be expected to reconcile the prohibitions which society has placed against child labor.
Id.
91. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
92. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat.
783, 816-20 (1968) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-62 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1984)). See
generally Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 321 (1987) (analyzing debate on bilingual education as a proxy for competing cultures and values).
93. J. GONZALES, MEXICAN AND MEXICAN AMERICAN FARM WORKERS: THE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 109 (1985). In this regard, Mexican households do not differ from most
other families in the United States. In 1985, both husband and wife in 70% of married-couple
families were employed. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1986 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 399 (106th ed. 1986) (Table No. 676).
94. G. DEL CASTILLO, LA FAMILIA: CHICANO FAMILIES IN THE URBAN SOUTHWEST, 1848 TO
THE PRESENT 41 (1984). While there has been much debate concerning the role of familism in the
assimilation process, the continued existence of the family as the central institution for MexicanAmericans is not disputed. Compare Tienda, supra note 55, at 404 (concluding that "ascriptive
ties in the host environment" neither hinder nor assist "the socioeconomic assimilation of Mexican
immigrants") with Mirand6, The Chicano Family: A Reanalysis of Conflicting Views, 39 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 747, 755 (1977) (asserting that the Chicano family has been a "critical force"
in resisting acculturation and assimilation).
95. See generally Keefe, Padilla & Carlos, The Mexican-American Extended Family as an
Emotional Support System, 38 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 144 (1979) (discussing the differences in
familial ties between Mexican-American and Anglo-American cultures).
96. Id. at 147. Anglos turn to friends, neighbors, co-workers, and groups more often than
relatives when kin are inaccessible. On the other hand, Mexican-Americans are more likely to
turn to members of their extended biological family, i.e., "real kin." Id. at 151. But see Massey,
supra note 57, at 104 (noting that "Iblecause of its explosive growth, migration has outgrown a
social organization based solely on kinship, and networks have increasingly incorporated thier
close social relations").
97. LA CHICANA, supra note 80, at 115. In a 1971 study in which Chicano children in the
Houston barrio were asked, "Whom do you love?," Chicano children listed only relatives; the
responses of Anglo and black children included many nonfamily members and friends. Id.
98. Clark & Mendelson, Mexican-American Aged in San Francisco: A Case Description, 9
GERONTOLOGY 90, 93 (1969).
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Within the family structure each parent has a delineated role.
Women have traditionally controlled the domestic sphere, in charge of
the household and child-rearing decisions. 99 Mothers have primary responsibility for providing both nurturance and discipline,100 and are
"critically involved in kin-related decision-making."'' Fathers, primarily responsible for the family's economic support,'0 2 are granted substantial deference as the titular heads of the family,10 3 and sometimes
exert real authority in the domestic sphere as well.'
The family is especially important for undocumented families who
have just migrated. 05 Migration is a stressful event involving separation from family and familiar surroundings, adjustment to a new culture, and job disruption. 06 Migration into an illegal status intensifies
the stressful impact of the experience. 7 Migration may be particularly
stressful for women, who are entering a society where their role differs
dramatically from that at home.' 08 Mexican women have been found to
rely on parents and siblings, especially older brothers, for such needs as
babysitting, car repairs, advice, and transportation to a greater degree
than black or Anglo women who tended to rely on commercial enterprise and friends for the same services. 0 9 In sum, kinship networks
99.

G. HOYNINGEN-HUENE,

THE MEXICAN HERITAGE

277 (1946) [hereinafter

THE MEXICAN

While the mother is often described as passive and submissive, she is in fact quite
powerful, and "responsible for the maintenance of the extended Chicano family in contemporary
urban society." Id. at 279.
100. LA CHICANA, supra note 80, at 113.
101. THE MEXICAN HERITAGE, supra note 99, at 278 (quoting WOMEN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 131-32 (M. Rosaldo ed. 1974)).
102. Id. at 277. As Mexican women have been stereotyped as submissive, the concept of "machismo," or obsessive masculinity, has been used to characterize Mexican men. See generally
Miranda, A Reinterpretationof Male Dominance in the Chicano Family, FAMILY COORDINATOR,
Oct. 1979, at 473, 474, 478 [hereinafter A Reinterpretation] (explaining that machismo has more
to do with "being responsible and providing for one's family," than with popular notions of irresponsibility and abusiveness).
103. MirandE, A Reinterpretation, supra note 102, at 478.
104. THE MEXICAN HERITAGE, supra note 99, at 278.
105. Parker, Kleiner & Needleman, Migration and Mental Illness, 3 SoC. SCIENCE &
MEDICINE 1, 9 (1969). But see Aronowitz, The Social and Emotional Adjustment of Immigrant
Children:A Review of the Literature, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 237, 240 (1984). Studies showing that migration is inherently stressful for children seek "to call attention to the problem and
make the case for the provision of services"; on the other hand, research that found immigrant
children to be no more or less disturbed than native children, sought to demonstrate that "immigrant children should not be viewed solely as a burden and a drain upon their adoptive countries."
Id.
106. Parker, Kleiner & Needleman, supra note 105, at 9.
107. See Vega, Kolody & Valle, Migrationand Mental Health: An Empirical Test of Depression Risk Factors Among Immigrant Mexican Women, 21 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 512, 515-16
(1987) (noting that the stressful nature of migrant's quest for employment is exacerbated by the
instability of illegal status).
108. Chaney, Women Who Go and Women Who Stay Behind, 10 MIGRATION TODAY 6, 1213 (1982) (trained not to confront authority, women may begin to resist their subjugated roles, a
process resulting in mental distress). The "tradition of feminine subservience" of Mexican migrant
women was described in Ruth Allen's early sociological study. Allen, Mexican Peon Women in
Texas, 16 Soc. & Soc. RES. 131 (1931).
109. TwICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 180-84 (M. Melville ed. 1980).
HERITAGE].
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serve not only as the base for Mexican migrational networks and familial economic structure, but continue as the essential source of emotional support for Mexican families once in the United States.
II.

IRCA

PRovIsIONS

Americans were told in 1981 that their country had "lost control of
its borders." 1 0 The official announcement coincided with a range of
hostile manifestations toward aliens from an American citizenry that
felt threatened by loss of jobs,"' loss of a common language," 2 and
loss of national prestige. 1 3 Remedies for these perceived losses took5
several forms: restrictions on alien employment"" and education,"
110. Administrations's Proposalson Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., IstSess. 6 (1981) [hereinafter Admin.'s Proposals] (testimony of Attorney General William French Smith) ("We have lost control of our borders. We have pursued
unrealistic policies. We have failed to enforce our laws effectively.").
The border was created in 1848. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United StatesMexico, 9 Stat. 922, 18 Stat. 492, T.S. No. 207. "From 1848 to 1894 there was no formal control
of the border and U.S. immigration statistics recorded only the arrivals of Mexicans at U.S. seaports. In 1894 the first two inspection stations were established along the Mexican border, primarily aimed at curbing the entrance of the Chinese." Lopez, supra note 30, at 643 n.145 (citations
omitted).
I 1. See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, THE ILLEGAL ALIEN FROM MEXICO: POLICY CHOICES FOR
AN INTRACTABLE ISSUE 11 (1980) (noting that "lilt is not accidental that the current hullabaloo
about illegal migrants started at a time of high unemployment in the United States"); DeBoer,
The Polls: Attitudes Toward Unemployment, 47 PUB.OPINION Q. 432, 432 (1983) (polls indicate
that in 1979, 66% of employed Americans considered it not at all likely that they would be unemployed within the year; by late 1982, only 49% thought likewise) (without further citation).
112. See generally Moran, supra note 92, at 326-41 (providing recent history of "English
Only" movement).
113. Several international events contributed to a sense of national impotence. See Kelly, Coping with America: Refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the 1970s and 1980s, 487
ANNALS 138, 148 (1986). Between 1975 and 1983 the United States admitted over 626,000 refugees from Southeast Asia. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1984 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (104th ed. 1983). Conflicts between Vietnamese and native minorities
in New Orleans and Albuquerque, and between Vietnamese and native fisherman in Texas and
Louisiana, are two examples of localized hostilities surrounding refugee resettlement. Kelly, supra,
at 148.
During a six month period in 1980, 125,000 Cubans disembarked in the United States. 1984
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 94. Many understood the flotilla as an
exploitation of American generosity. Scanlan & Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-1980: Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba, 467 ANNALS 116, 136 (1983).
The seizure of the American embassy in Iran in 1979 intensified an emerging xenophobia. See
generally Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (review of the termination of extended voluntary departure for Iranians and INS re-registration of Iranian students in the wake of
the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Iran), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); Iranians
in U.S. Fear Retaliation on Two Fronts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1979, at A18, col. 1.
114. See generally Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (California's exclusion of
aliens as deputy probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (New York's exclusion of certain resident aliens from public school teaching); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (New York's exclusion of aliens from police force).
115. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Texas statute preventing the enrollment of undocumented immigrant school children in publicly funded schools held to violate equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
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statutes affirming the supremacy of English in public discourse"', and

on ballots, 17 and community opposition to the resettlement of any
more foreigners."8 These responses "from a frustrated and unamused

American public"11 9 found legitimacy in the developing theory of
"compassion fatigue," 2 the justifiable limit on American responsibility
for the world's distressed.
While some responses were directed at aliens legally present in the
United States, such as refugees"', the greatest efforts at regaining control were focused on the population of undocumented aliens.' 2 These
efforts culminated in the enactment of IRCA, characterized by President Reagan as "a major step toward meeting this challenge to our
sovereignty.' 2 3
IRCA attempts to control the problem of undocumented aliens
through a combination of three techniques. First, employers who hire
undocumented workers may be fined and jailed. 2 4 Second, aliens who
116. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CONST., Art. 11I,
§ 6 (West Supp. 1988) (added by Initiative Measure, Nov. 4, 1986) (authorizing the legislature and State officials to "take all steps necessary to
insure that the role of English as the common language of the state of California is preserved and
enhanced"). But see Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (dictum)
(describing the "all steps necessary" clause as "primarily a symbolic statement"). Twelve States
have now declared English their official state language; in 1987, legislatures in twenty other States
were considering the issue. Aros, Prop. 63 Leaves State's Legislators Tongued-Tied, IMPACT: THE
NEWSLETTER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST CLEARINGHOUSE, Summer 1987, at I. For an illustration
of violent animosity toward non-English speakers, see Man Stabbed to Death for Speaking Spanish, HISPANIC LINK WEEKLY, June 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
In 1980, Florida Dade County voters forbad the expenditures of county funds not only "for the
purpose of utilizing any language other than English," but for "promoting any culture other than
that of the United States." Approval of Anti-Bilingual Measure Causes Confusion and Worry in
Miami Area, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980 § 1,at 24, col. I (emphasis added).
117. Loo, The 'Biliterate' Ballot Controversy: Language Acquisition and Cultural Shift
Among Immigrants, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 493, 494 (1985) (noting that in 1984, 71% of all
Californians voting "urged an amendment of Federal law so that ballots, voter pamphlets, and all
other official voting materials would be printed in English only"). A common reason for opposing
bilingual ballots is the perceived resistance of immigrants to assimilate. See id. at 495.
118. See Stein, The Commitment to Refugee Resettlement, 467 ANNALS 187, 199 (1983).
"Confused by the distinctions between foreigners, refugees, asylees, aliens, entrants, migrants, and
numerous other terms, many people in these hard times simply wanted to keep people out." Id.
The decision to deny refugee status to Haitian boat people after the Cuban Mariel flotilla was
based in part on the "profound fear of uncontrollable numbers of refugees." Zucker, supra note
38, at 153.
119. Simpson, The Politics of Immigration Reform, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 486, 503
(1984) (Sen. Simpson).
120. Simpson, We Can't Allow All Salvadorans To Stay, Wash. Post, July 10, 1984, at A13,
col. 2 (editorial by Sen. Simpson) (stating that granting voluntary departure status to Salvadorans
is an "indiscriminate selection -process [that] would only further the 'compassion fatigue,' which
will lessen our nation's willingness to respond to the millions of truly persecuted humans all over
the planet"); see SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1985,
S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (noting that "the ability of the American people
to welcome aliens into their day-to-day life experiences has limits").
121. The burden of English-only ballots, for example, is carried by American citizens whose
primary language is not English.
122. See SELECT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 35.
123. 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1534, 1534 (Nov. 6, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5856-1, 5856-1.
124. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(e)(4)-(f) (West Supp. 1987) (employer sanctions: civil and criminal

19871

FAMILY UNIFICATION

have lived or worked in the country illegally for specified periods of
time may apply for legal temporary residence status." 5 Third, the immigration laws are to be more vigorously enforced at the border and in
the immigration courts. 2 ' Thus, by removing the economic incentives
to enter or stay illegally, by legalizing certain undocumented aliens and
deporting or encouraging the departure of the others, and by increasing
both the difficulty of physical entry and the speed of adjudication of
claims to remain, the Act is intended to "eliminat[e] the illegal alien
'27
problem in this country.'
Without evaluating the range of problems created by various IRCA
provisions, this article focuses on the manner in which IRCA unjustifiably promotes family dissolution. Four IRCA provisions most directly
thwart the continuity of family relationships. An assessment of each
requirement and its effect on the undocumented family follows.
A. The Requirement of Individual Eligibility and the Absence of
Derivative Status
IRCA authorizes the adjustment to legal status of undocumented
aliens who have either lived or worked in the United States for specified periods of time.' 2 8 Whether eligibility is based on residential or
occupational grounds, each alien must individually meet the requirements for legalization. Husbands, wives, and children do not receive
derivative status by virtue of the familial relationship. 2 9
The requirement of individual eligibility imposed on undocumented
aliens in the legalization context is contrary to the treatment of other
alien families authorized to enter or remain in the United States. No
independent showing of eligibility is required for the spouse or minor
children of immigrants,13 0 refugees,13' asylees,132 and certain nonimmigrants.' 3 3 Rather, the principle of derivative status entitles immediate
families of aliens in these categories to the same immigration status as
the principal applicant.1'3 Derivative status recognizes the importance
of family integrity within American culture and its particular signifipenalties).
125. See supra note 4.
126. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 note (West Supp. 1987).
127. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205 (1987) (Supplementary
Information).
128. See supra note 4.
129. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. The Reagan Administration recently clarified "family fairness" issues. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (1982).
131. Id. § 1157(c)(2).
132. Id. § 1158(c).
133. Id. § 110l(a)(15)(A), (E)-(M).
134. See also id. § 1432-33 (1982) (derivative citizenship for the minor children of naturalized parents).
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35
cance to newcomers to the community.1
The United States does not require other legal aliens to choose between their families and immigration. Moreover, in accordance with
America's commitment to the principles of family unity in such international documents as the 1975 Helsinki Accords," a ' the United States
has fiercely objected to countries that impose that choice upon their
citizens. Yet that choice is imposed on the many applicants who qualify
for legalization but whose immediate relatives do not.
The skimpy legislative history of IRCA provides no direct explanation of why Congress denied derivative status to the immediate relatives of legalized aliens. The family unity issue may have been discussed indirectly in debate on the duration of the residency
requirement.13 7 Congress may not have fully understood the sequential
nature of Mexican family migration. 38 Perhaps most significant was
the conviction among supporters of an immigration reform package
that any appearance of excess generosity to illegal aliens-such as including their families-would have killed the legalization program altogether.13 9 Legalization itself was accepted not from any compensatory
reckoning regarding American complicity in sixty years of labor procurement, but rather for various pragmatic reasons, including the desire to avoid the mass deportations and internal border enforcement
otherwise required to dislodge the undocumented population. 40

135. Throughout American immigration history, the presence of family has eased the process
of adjustment by providing the immigrant group with both emotional and cultural continuity. See
Perez, Cubans in the United States, 487 ANNALS 126, 132 (1986).
136. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
137. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
138. Under the Reagan Administration's initial legalization proposal, undocumented aliens
were to be admitted as temporary residents on a three-year renewable basis with no family members to receive derivative status. Admin.'s Proposals, supra note 110, at 32. Asked about the
restriction on family members, Attorney General William French Smith responded: "It is not a
separation. We are talking . . . about people who are already here, and in most cases people who
have been here for a minimum of 1'/2 years." Id. at 33.
139. See Letter from Richard Day, Minority Counsel, Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Carol Sanger (Apr. 28, 1987) (available on file at
the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal). Day wrote:
The legalization was politically unpopular. An amendment to strike the legalization entirely in the House was defeated by a 7-vote margin. An amendment in the Senate to make
Opinion polls indicated that a majority
it more generous was defeated by a 3-to-I vote ....
of the American public did not support a legalization and, in some areas such as New
Mexico and Texas, the Hispanic community either opposed a legalization or supported it
by a bare plurality. The mail to the Subcommittee was heavily against the legalization. It
was only because a conservative Republican like Senator Simpson led the debate that we
had legalization as part of the bill.
Id.
140.

See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND LEGALIZATION AMEND-

AET OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653 (to accompany H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985)) (noting that "intensifying interior enforcement or attempting mass deportations would be
both costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage").
MENTS
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Recognizing that legalization was enacted not out of altruism, but
out of necessity, a consistent, if ignoble, set of reasons for minimizing
the number of eligible aliens emerges. The first is the fear of hordes. 4 1
Second, while it appears that undocumented aliens have deposited more
in taxes than they have withdrawn in services,' 4 2 opponents of amnesty
feared that an extension of legal status to spouses and children would
increase costly expenditures for social services.' 4 Third, Congress saw
no need to favor a population whose retention of linguistic and cultural
traditions' 4 4 and low naturalization rates 4 5 evidenced an unwillingness
Representative Fish stated: "Clearly, our Government is not going to go after [undocumented
aliens with equity in the United States who refuse to leave the country]. We have neither the
resources nor the desire nor the public support for a nationwide search of millions of undocumented aliens." 132 CONG. REC. H9789 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (opposing amendment to strike
legalization provisions).
Representative Torres stated:
This bill is not perfect .... But when it came time to final passage of the bill, members
had to ask themselves: Should we seize the moment and pass the bill now, even though it
may not have everything we want? Or should we kill the bill and risk a more punitive bill
in the next Congress? I chose not to gamble, and voted for the best immigration bill possible under current political conditions.
Torres, It Was the Best Bill Possible, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 21, 1986, § I, at 4, col. 3; see also
CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that the Select Comm'n on Immigration and
Refugee Policy (SCIRP) recommended legalization to end labor law and civil rights violations
resulting from a large subclass).
141. See 132 CONG. REC. H9727 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Daub articulating five reasons to oppose amnesty generally). Representative Daub stated:
If you look at the issue of population control, if you look at the fact, and everyone is in
agreement that you are going to have between 10 and 20 million people legalized and if
only half of those people come forward and take advantage of general amnesty and you
multiply that times the chain of seven relatives who will be eligible for entry into this
country, then you are looking at between 50 and 100 million new faces that will be added
to the population flood to this country.
id.
142. See In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 570-71 (S.D. Tex.
1980) ("Nearly all of the recent studies which discuss contributions of undocumented aliens to
local, state and federal tax bases suggest that this group pays more into the tax structure than
they [sic] take out through social services."); SELECT COMM'N, STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at
519, 530.
143. Cf. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(h) (West Supp. 1987) (five year disqualification of newly legalized aliens from receiving certain public welfare assistance).
144.

See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1985, S.

REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985).
We see evidence that if the newcomers to a community do not excessively disrupt or
change the attributes of the community which make it familiar to its residents and
uniquely their "home" . . . then the newcomers may be welcome, especially if they make
positive contributions to the community's economic and general well-being. On the other
hand, if it is seen that the newcomers remain "foreign," they may not be welcome, especially if they seek to carve out separate enclaves to embrace only their own language and
culture and if their numbers and the areas of the community which they directly affect are
great.
Id.
145. Id. at 7. "A desire to assimilate is often reflected by the rate at which an immigrant
completes the naturalization process. ....
Of those of Mexican origin who remained in the United
States at the end of seven years, only 5 percent had naturalized." Id. The Committee was hardpressed, however, to fit the even lower rates of naturalization for English-speaking Canadians into
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to assimilate. Finally, overly generous eligibility requirements might
have encouraged additional illegal arrivals by aliens willing to bet
against Congress' commitment to amnesty as a one-shot deal."'
But these justifications inadequately support interfering with longstanding immigration practices respecting family unity. Concerns about
hordes ignore the conclusion by the Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) that the "legalization program would not
significantly increase the number of permanent entrants to the United
States."" 7 It is simply not known how many of the successful alien
applicants have ineligible spouses and children who would benefit from
a derivative immigration status. Moreover, in the past Congress has
overcome the problem of unwanted but anticipated chain migration by

limiting "fifth preference" visa petitions for alien adult siblings.148
Second, the financial burden of the additional legalized aliens is unknown. In a recent projection of future budget outlays the Congressional Budget Office qualified its figures both because of uncertainty
regarding the numbers of aliens and because of uncertainty regarding
the number who would qualify for governmental assistance profamily
grams." There is insufficient evidence to indicate that legalized
50
communities.1
their
to
burden
members will be a financial
its general theory of separatist enclaves. Id.
146. Senator Simpson noted: "But it was never intended for legalization to give any group
special consideration, but to address only a serious national problem and to do it one time and say,
'This is it. It is a one-shot.'" 133 CONG. REC. S13,737 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987) (debating Sen.
Chafee on his bill, S. 1408, 100th Cong., IstSess., 133 CONG. REC. S13,727 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1987) (introduced on Senate floor as Amendment No. 894)).
147. CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra note 22, at 25; SELECT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra
note 21, at 107 ("The Commission majority is of the view that an annual increase in numerically
limited immigration from 270,000 to 350,000 will provide benefits without straining U.S. ethnic
and social relations or harming the U.S. labor market."); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1160(a) (West
Supp. 1987) (generous legalization eligibility requirement for SAWs).
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982) (fifth preference visa allocation). In 1982, Congress authorized
temporary H-2 workers in the American Virgin Islands to adjust to permanent status. Concerned
that too many relatives would tag along behind the new permanent residents, Congress limited
them from applying for siblings under the fifth, and perhaps least justifiable, visa preference category. D. NORTH, THE VIRGIN ISLANDS LEGALIZATION PROGRAM: LESSONS FOR THE MAINLAND 14
(1983).
The fifth preference has been identified as the chief offender in chain migration. SELECT
COMM'N, STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, app. D at 47-54 (testimony of Charles B. Keely).
149. See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND LEGALIZATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, HR. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 25, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5757, 5774-75. A case study of the Texas public school systems
following Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), indicates that the fears about the financial and
social costs of extending public school enrollment to undocumented children were ill founded.
Cardenas & Cortez, The Impact of Doe v. Plyler Upon Texas Public Schools, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 1
(1986). The actual number of undocumented students was far below many original projections.
Id. at 11. The essential cause of the Texas school financing problems remained its regressive
property tax, not its accommodation of undocumented children. Id. at 15.
150. Passel, supra note 21, at 196-97 ("On balance, it would not be unreasonable to expect an
immediate net contribution to society from legalized undocumented aliens."). "It is thus clear,"
Justice Brennan wrote in Plyler, "that whatever savings might be achieved by denying [undocumented] children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these
children, the State, and the Nation." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Responding to
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Criticism that invokes cultural separatism is particularly unfair.

While "for most of the twentieth century[] Americans have assumed
that newcomers should and would adapt to the mores of the host soci-

ety," 151 undocumented Mexican aliens have remained outside the dominant American culture in part because assimilation has made little
sense. 52 Attempts to become "American" have not always been wel-

come. 153 Even citizenship has not always protected Mexican-Ameri-

cans: during the repatriation drives of the 1930s and 1950s, U.S. citizens were also sent "back" to Mexico." 4 Low naturalization rates may

not signify separatism as much as "the very uncertain commitment to a
life-long stay in the United States. 1 55 Today's cultural separatism may
not be very different from the adherence to familiar customs and language shown by most first- and second-generation immigrants. 5 Even

groups such as Cuban-Americans, who retain a high degree of national
cultural heritage, over time experience the "usual intergenerational
'5 7
shift toward greater acculturation and assimilation.' 1

Plyler, Congress did not include educational benefits among those benefits whose receipt bars
admission to an otherwise admissible undocumented alien eligible for legalization. See 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1987) (Special Rule for determination of public charge exclusion). Similarly, federal educational programs are not included among the public benefits unavailable to legalized aliens for five years. Id. § 1255a(h).
151. Archdeacon, Problems and Possibilitiesin the Study of American Immigration and Ethnic History, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 112, 114 (1985).
152. See Pachon, supra note 73, at 304 (noting that an important factor in Hispanic and
Latino failure to naturalize is their sense of "being 'outsiders' subject to discriminatory treatment" in the United States). Mexican failure to assimilate may also be explained by the fact
"that Chicanos are native to the Southwest" and, in effect, "had a foreign culture and language
imposed upon them." Miranda, The Chicano Family, supra note 94, at 754. A consequence of
such "internal colonialism" is that Chicano "culture, values, and language ... thus have no formal or legitimate standing within American society." Id. at 755.
153. See KITANO, supra note 49, at 246. As Kitano observed,
The slaves, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Filipinos were all desired for their ability to
work at hard and tedious jobs that most white Americans did not want. They became
problems when they desired things that were reserved primarily for white Americans-marriage, a family, civil rights, decent housing, a good education, equal opportunities, and ultimate peer status as Americans.
Id.
154. IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS, supra note 30, at 238 (stating that the fact "[tihat a
number of citizen children were sent back to Mexico on repatriation trains is not disputed.").
155. One commentator noted:
Many new immigrants also believe that acquiring U.S. citizenship means giving up rights
and benefits in their native countries. Mexican immigrants, for example, are often under
the mistaken impression that they will forfeit all of their rights to property ownership if
they relinquish Mexican citizenship. The fact is that Mexico only prohibits ownership by
non-citizens of coastal properties, properties within 100 kilometers of national borders, and
properties considered to be in the national interest, but the perception remains.
Pachon, supra note 73, at 305 (citing Embassy of Mexico, Fact Sheet for Mexicans Living
Abroad, Washington, D.C. (1984)).
156. See Perez, supra note 35, at 136.
157. Id. Cuban retention of cultural patterns is particularly strong because of a bunched settlement in south Florida, and because many Cubans, having assumed their stay in the United
States was merely temporary, had little interest in assimilating. Nevertheless, English is probably
the principle language among Cubans who have lived most of their lives in the United States. Id.;

322

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:295

Finally, breaking up the undocumented family means that children
are separated from their parents because of their parents' migration to

the United States. This ignores American policies that encouraged and
tolerated such migration. " It also ignores the Supreme Court's mandate that "legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct

against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice." 69
B.

The Requirement of Five Year Continuous Illegal Residence

IRCA requires that legalization applicants prove that they have been
in the United States illegally since before January 1, 1982, a five-year

cut-off. Five years was chosen for several reasons. First, a five year
continuous stay indicated a sufficient commitment to the United
States. 60 Second, SCIRP first recommended an amnesty program in
its 1981 report.1 8 ' In tying the residency cut-off to the SCIRP's recommendation, Congress tried to prevent the legalization program itself
from drawing undocumented aliens aware of the SCIRP recommenda' Third, the number of eligible aliens decreases as the duration of
tion. "62
the illegal residency requirement increases. The January 1, 1982 date
met congressional concerns about the numbers of those immediately eligible for legalization as well as the numbers of their many relatives

eventually eligible for visas under the first, second, and fifth preference
categories. 163
While these factors may explain why Congress chose a five year unlawful residency requirement, 6 4 they ignore the effect of this require-

ment on undocumented families. Because many Mexican families do
see DeSipio, Social Science Literature and the Naturalization Process, 21 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 390, 401 (1987) (noting that schooling in the United States increases the likelihood of
citizenship).
158. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (Texas Proviso to the INA).
159. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
160. Cf.Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding requirement of five year continuous
residency before permanent resident alien qualifies for social security benefits).
161. SELECT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 21 (March I, 1981).
162. See NORTH, supra note 148, at 22. The Australian legalization program was kept secret
until the day before its effective date to deter unintended beneficiaries. Id.; see also Law On
Aliens Fails to Halt Salvadorans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at A3, col. 4 (cable from American
Embassy in El Salvador suggesting that awareness of possible suspension of deportation for illegal
Salvadorans in U.S. is encouraging illegal entries by Salvadorans "convinced ...that the United
States is not serious about enforcing its immigration laws").
163. See Admin.'s Proposals,supra note 110, at 32 (testimony of Attorney General William
French Smith) (proposal requiring ten years of continuous residence before a legalized alien could
petition for relatives).
164. See CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra note 22, at 32 (Lawrence Fuchs, Exec. Dir. of
SCIRP, stating that the cut-off date "should be no longer than two years prior to legislation.");
Rodriguez, Corral & Roman, The Struggle Against the Immigration Control Act, 8 CHICANO L.
REV. 1, 24 (1985) (recommending a "non-conditional amnesty-legalization program, with a reasonable, just, and humane cut-off date").
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not cross the border as a group,""6 the number of qualifying family
members decreases as the requisite illegal residency period increases.

Congress, in setting the residency requirement at five years, had before
it a report on the amnesty programs of Canada, Australia, France, ArThe residency requirements in these progentina, and Venezuela.'
grams ranged from eight months to two years. 16 7 The shorter time requirements adopted by these countries were chosen in part to prevent
the predictable consequence of a policy that effectively excludes family
members thereby perpetuating a significant illegal population. 8 Thus,
as testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed, "[tfhere
is no wall high enough nor acceptable enforcement methods available
to prevent the re-unification of a family unit. Our experience in dealing
with this problem over the years convinces us that neither the Congress

nor the public want family separation as a policy." '
C.

The Public Charge Exclusion
An alien who has met the residential or occupational requirements

unique to legalization must also satisfy the admission standards used
generally for aliens entering the country. These standards include the
qualitative restrictions, or exclusions, used to keep out aliens who fall
165. See, e.g., Meissner, A Better Fatefor Split Families, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1987, Part II,
at 7, col. 3 (editorial).
166. EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND BACKGROUND ON LEGALIZATION: PROGRAMS OF

146-78 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter IMPACT AND BACKGROUND] (prepared for House Judiciary Comm.).
Congress studied these five programs "specifically selected because they represent different immigration problems and policy approaches which could prove useful when considering the merits
and uses of legalization." Id. at 146. But while the report used by the Judiciary Committee evaluates the structure, funding, and implementation of the different programs, it failed to investigate
the processing of families. The omission again reflects congressional depreciation of the significance of the family unity problem.
167. IMPACT AND BACKGROUND, supra note 166, at 174. "Although governments, in most
cases, expected larger turnouts than were actually realized, most reported satisfaction with the
outcome of their efforts and indicated that what they had accomplished was important for the
country." Id. at 177.
168. See Legalization of Illegal Immigrants: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-114 (1981) [hereinafter Legalization of Illegal Immigrants] (objections to Reagan Administration amnesty proposal;
anticipated adverse effects of granting lawful status to undocumented aliens).
OTHER COUNTRIES

If enacted, the Administration proposal would at best continue a policy which adds significantly to illegal immigration. [Tihe smuggling of family members into the United
States is already a huge and shameful problem. From our experience we estimate that 30%
to 40% of the illegal alien population are [sic] illegal family groups. The Administration's
proposal, prohibiting the lawful re-unification of a family will significantly escalate this
problem. The social costs of a population of family groups unable or fearful to avail themselves of such institutions as schools and public health services are unquantifiable.
Id. at 104 (prepared statement of Michael G. Harpold, President, National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, American Federation of Government Employees, opposing ten year
residency requirement prior to reunification of legalized alien with immediate family members).
169. Id.
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into any of thirty-three categories of undesirability, the bulk of which

were first established by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.17'
IRCA tailors the exclusions for legalization applicants in a number
of ways. First, Congress exempted the exclusions immediately applicable to most undocumented aliens, such as failing to possess a labor certificate, valid entry document, or properly issued visa.17 1 Second, the

Attorney General may waive all but eight of the remaining grounds for
exclusion.172 While these waiver provisions are more generous than
most waivers in immigration law,173 serious eligibility problems for undocumented families remain by reason of IRCA's "public charge"
74
exclusion.1
While America may seem willing on first glance to take the tired and
poor, aliens likely to remain poor are kept out under the public charge

exclusion.175 Within the regular immigrant admissions process, an alien
whose family income is below federal poverty guidelines is presumed
ineligible under this exclusion.' 76 Recognizing, however, that the past
income of undocumented workers might fall well below the poverty
level,"' Congress created a Special Rule 78 for determining whether a
legalization applicant is "likely to become a public charge.' 79 The
Special Rule provides that "[a]n alien is not ineligible [as a public
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (1982) (substantially codifying INA, ch. 477, § 212(a)(l)(31), 66 Stat. 163, 182-87).
171. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
172. Id. § 1255a(d)(2)(B).
173. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982) (The McGovern Amendment, giving Attorney General authority to waive exclusion for alien Communists); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043,
1059 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd mem. 56 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1987) (3-3) (per curiam); id. at 107374 (Bork, J., dissenting) (the McGovern Amendment neither requires the Secretary of State to
recommend a waiver nor requires the Attorney General to grant one).
174. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(1I) (West Supp. 1987) (non-waivable).
175. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (any alien "who by reason of poverty, insanity,
disease, or disability will probably become a charge upon the public"). The public charge exclusion is responsible for the greatest number of visa denials. Consular Discretion in the Immigrant
Visa-Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 87, 113 (1978) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 76 (1975)).
176. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.91(a)(15)(i)-(iii) (1987). The regulation states that "[ain alien relying solely on the personal income he will be receiving to establish eligibility
...who does not establish that he will have an annual income above the income poverty guidelines published annually . . . and who is without other adequate financial resources, shall be presumed ineligible." Id. § 42.91(a)(15)(iii) (such guidelines to be published by Department of
Health and Human Services). But see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
245a.2(k)(4)) ("Special rule for determination of public charge: An alien who has a consistent
employment history which shows the ability to support himself and his or her family, even though
his income may be below the poverty level, may be admissible").
177. Wheeler & Zacovic, The Public Charge Ground of Exclusion for Legalization Applicants, 64 Interp. Rel. 1046, 1047 (Sept. 14, 1987). "Congress was aware that the majority of
applicants for legalization were 'working poor' whose incomes were below the poverty-level guidelines, but who nevertheless were unlikely to become 'welfare-dependent.'" Id.
178. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1987) ("Special Rule for Determination
of Public Charge").
179. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1985, S. REP.
No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985).
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charge] if the alien demonstrates a history of employment in the

United States evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assistance. '"18 The INS regulations expand the statutory directive by requiring an applicant to demonstrate the "capacity to exist on his or her
income and maintain his or her family without recourse to public cash

assistance."'' The INS has defined "public cash assistance" as "income or needs-based monetary assistance, to include but not limited to
supplemental security income, received by the alien or his or her immediate family members through Federal, State, or local programs
designed to meet subsistence levels.", 8 An alien may thus be excluded
180. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1987). The Special Rule comports with
the Senate minority view on S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), which, as amended, ultimately
became law. 132 CONG. REC. H10,599 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986); id. at S16,915. Senator Simon
remarked,
The chairman has already spoken on many occasions about the exploitable underclass of
undocumented aliens in this country today. It is evident that these people who are productive members of society but who are unable, for example, to seek redress for crimes, who
are fearful of reporting job-related abuse, and who have virtually nowhere to turn. They
are forced to live a semiclandestine life.
1985, S. REP. No. 132,
99th Cong., IstSess. 108 (1985) (minority views of Sen. Simon).
181. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4)) (emphasis
added). "This regulation is prospective in that the Service shall determine, based on the alien's
history, whether he or she is likely to become a public charge. Past acceptance of public cash
assistance within a history of consistent employment will enter into this decision." Id.
182. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(i)) (emphasis added),
SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF

It does not include assistance in kind, such as food stamps, public housing, or other noncash benefits, nor does it include work-related compensation or certain types of medical
assistance (Medicare, Medicaid, emergency treatment, services to pregnant women or children under 18 years of age, or treatment in the interest of public health).
Id.; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(h)(l)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing the Attorney General to
identify federal financial assistance programs to be withheld from a legal temporary resident for
five years, "but in any event including the aid to families with dependent children"); see also id. §
1255a(h)(1)(B) (authorizing States to withhold financial assistance for a five year period beginning on the date an alien obtains temporary resident status).
One commentator suggests that "the only programs that will be considered 'cash assistance' are
those in which the benefit (1)is paid in cash, (2) is based on financial need, and (3) is designed to
meet subsistence needs." Zavocic, How the Receipt of Public Benefits Can Endanger an Alien's
Immigration Status, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 126, 129 (1987).
For a compelling discussion of the constitutionality of section 1255a(h)(1)(B), see G. Neuman,
Equal Protection, Preemption, and Benefits Disqualification (1986) (manuscript available on file
at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal). Under a preemption approach in alienage discrimination cases, Neuman argues that State eligibility rules for benefits disqualification will be upheld
by the courts because section 1255a(h)(1)(B) expressly authorizes States to make such rules.
State rules would conform to congressional intent. The States would be extended the deference
accorded Congress in its immigration policy.
On the other hand, Neuman argues, State laws are subject to stricter scrutiny, regardless of
congressional intent, under an equal protection approach. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), the Supreme Court held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the equal
protection clause. In IRCA, Congress did not impose State benefits-disqualification rules, but referred the issue to the States, "demonstrat[ing] there is no federal policy against State benefits for
legalized aliens." States cannot claim that legalized aliens are not a suspect class because unlike
the illegal alien parents in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the legalized aliens are afortiori
no longer illegally present in the United States. To deny benefits to a group of former violators is
to engage in invidious alienage discrimination.
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because an immediate family member has properly accepted governmental assistance. 183
There are several things wrong with this. First, the regulations appear to exceed statutory authority by expanding the measure for public
charge to include receipt of assistance by family members. 184 Second,
to disqualify aliens who have accepted public cash assistance, such as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),' 85 on behalf of
their citizen children creates an unnecessary conflict between federal
statutes-the Social Security Act's AFDC provisions and IRCA-and
places alien parents at its center. The policy considerations underlying
the AFDC program are "the provision of basic necessities to needy
children ... and the need for a method of doing so while preserving as
nearly as possible a conventional family structure with its concomitant
sociological benefits to children."' 86 Indeed, parental entitlement to
continued custody of children is sometimes conditioned upon the parent's applying for and receiving public assistance. For example, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA)' 87 requires
State social service agencies to make "reasonable efforts" 188 to maintain children in their homes prior to their removal and placement in
foster care. "Reasonable efforts" have included the provision of day
care, counseling, homemaker services, and cash payments, including
AFDC.'89 Thus, State child welfare agencies often recommend that
parents apply for AFDC in order to prevent the child's removal from
her home. 90 Alien parents should not be penalized under IRCA for
having accepted benefits authorized to maintain a child's well-being
183. Policies differ among INS districts. The San Francisco Legalization Office, for example,
does not exclude applicants on the basis of AFDC payments received by relatives unless the applicant can show no other source of income. In that case, the INS assumes that the applicant was
supported by the public benefits and "[tihe applicant will then have a public charge problem."
Memo from Katherine Brady, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, to Community Agencies Doing
Legalization Work and AILA members 11 (Dec. 14, 1987) (summarizing minutes of INS Liaison
meetings, Oct. 1987) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal).
184. The INS has interpreted the Special Rule "as an independent requirement which supersedes pre-existing law on public charge exclusion." Wheeler & Zovocic, supra note 177, at 1048.
Thus, the regulations actually create a more difficult standard for overcoming the public charge
presumption than had been used previously by either the INS or the State Department. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (1982 & Supp. 111984).
186. Boucher v. Minter, 349 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (D. Mass. 1972); see Waits v. Swoap, 11
Cal. 3d 887, 896, 524 P.2d 117, 122, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21, 26 (dictum) (defining the fundamental
purpose of AFDC as "the preservation of the health of the state's children, the potential leaders of
tomorrow"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
187. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1982).
189. Golubuck, Cash Assistance to Families:An Essential Component of Reasonable Efforts
to Prevent and Eliminate Foster Care Placement of Their Children. 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1393, 1394 (1986).
190. FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (M. Hardin ed. 1983) 255-57 (noting that the failure
of an agency to adequately assist parents can be raised as a defense in parental termination
proceedings).
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under AFDC and required to assure family unity under AACWA.
The Special Rule, in both its statutory and regulatory manifestations, resulted in real and immediate harm to undocumented families.
Aware of the Special Rule, but uncertain of its breadth, some undocu-

mented aliens have refused to accept public assistance benefits for
which they or their families are eligible. The INS has stated that
"[tihe weight given in considering applicability of the public charge
provisions will depend on many factors, but the length of time an applicant has received public cash assistance will constitute a significant factor."' 19 Thus the National Center for Immigrants' Rights (NCIR) now
counsels advocates
to advise clients of the potential effect of the receipt of cash assistance on their legalization applications and to encourage them to
do everything possible to stop receiving the assistance before they

make their applications. It may be advisable for a client currently
receiving assistance to wait several months, until his or her financial situation has improved, before applying for legalization. 92
As a result, undocumented parents entitled to receive essential benefits
for their citizen children are declining them in order to preserve a legalization case. 19 3
Children, too, may be excluded for being public charges. The INS
has determined that undocumented children in foster care 9" are subject to the public charge exclusion and that Federal foster care pay191. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4)). An applicant
must "agree to fully cooperate" in the INS verification of employment history or risk denial of the
application. Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(5)).
192. Zavocic, supra note 182, at 129. NCIR recognizes of course that "filn many if not most
cases, it will be impracticable for families to stop receiving assistance" and that "there may be
legal challenges to the INS practice of calculation of benefits paid for other family members
against the alien under the special rule." Id. at 129 n.23. Nevertheless, because the advice to
decline benefits is prudent, it will likely be heeded at serious sacrifice to family well-being.
193. Courts have in several instances struck down State practices that put undocumented parents at risk for obtaining entitlements for their eligible children. In Doe v. Miller, F. Supp. 416
(N.D. Ill. 1983), for example, undocumented alien parents in Illinois enjoined the Illinois Department of Public Aid from forcing them either to withdraw food stamp applications for their citizen
children or to disclose information about their own immigration status under threat of being reported to the INS. The district court held that the State's policies and practices "placed [the]
parents in a quandary" which irreparably harmed the plaintiff children by compromising their
right to have applications made on their behalf. Id. at 468. The court found the State practice to
be "blatantly inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of federal laws governing administration of
the food stamp program." Id. at 465. Undocumented parents with citizen children entitled to
AFDC are much like the families of Doe v. Miller. The Special Rule disqualifies otherwise qualified aliens from legalization because they have properly received governmental assistance for their
children. This places the parents in an unacceptable quandary, undermines congressional intent in
establishing the entitlements, and risks endangering the health of the intended children
beneficiaries.
194. See R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 70 (1985) (noting that many children are placed in foster care voluntarily by parents,
most often young and poor, who cannot care for them due to such factors as parental illness,
absence, or economic pressures).
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ments are "public cash assistance" for purposes of the Special Rule.19
Regional Directors have been advised, however, that "receipt of such
payments should not be the sole determinant of 'public charge.' Rather,
the totality of the child's circumstances, including affidavits of support
from the foster parents" should be considered. 90 The "flexible approach [to] be taken in reviewing public charge issues with respect to
minor children' ' 197 in foster care may result in waivers for otherwise
amnesty-qualified children. In practical effect, however, it gives arbitrary power to INS administrators to decide the eligibility of foster
children. Moreover, there is no justifiable basis for excluding any foster
children, who are not responsible for either their foster status or the
financial circumstances of their foster parents.
D.

Waiver of Exclusions

IRCA provides that all but eight grounds for exclusion may be
waived "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it
is otherwise in the public interest."' 9 8 While these criteria appear particularly promising to the undocumented family, they are bounded by
two important limitations. First, the exclusion waivers benefit only
those aliens who have first met the illegal presence requirements; they
do not cure ineligibility caused by serial arrivals into the United States.
The waivers, therefore, remedy family separation only for a small subset of undocumented aliens. Second, the statutory waivers are discretionary, not of right.1 99
1. Family Unity
The INS defines "family unity" as the principle of "maintaining the
family group without deviation or change. The family group shall include the spouse, unmarried minor children under 18 years of age who
are not members of some other household, and parents who reside regularly in the household of the family group."200 The definition is objec195. Legalization Eligibility, County Dependent Children: Memorandum to William King,
Jr., Director for Reform, Western Region, from William S. Slattery, Assistant Commissioner,
Legalization, Office of Legalization (Dec. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Legalization Eligibility] (available
on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal).
196. Id. The INS policy seems to call for waivers in cases of wealthier foster parents, which is
not only unfair to the child, but invidiously discriminates against poor foster parents. Cf. Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 404, 406 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a provision that,
in some cases, allows rich but not poor to marry is "inconsistent with our tradition of administering justice equally to the rich and to the poor" and violates equal protection).
197. Legalization Eligibility, supra note 195.
198. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
199. Id. § 1255a(d)(B)(i); see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
245a.2(k)(2)). District directors have discretionary-review authority over applications for waiver
of grounds of excludability. Id.
200. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,209 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(m)).
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tionable on at least two grounds.
First, the INS unduly narrows the meaning of the term "unity." The
phrase "maintaining the group without deviation or change" suggests
that standing to invoke the exception is limited only to specified relatives who have been living at home. For example, under the INS definition of unity, a minor child cared for in the United States by an aunt
living apart from the child's parents cannot assert that residence with
her natural parents is necessary to preserve family unity; the child's
return to her parents' home would change, not maintain, the family
unit.2"'
The INS definition of family unity fails to acknowledge that for a
variety of reasons many children in this country live with nonparental
relatives outside the family home.20 Children of undocumented agricultural workers may live with relatives for reasons directly connected
to their parents' disadvantaged immigration status, as migrant parents
sometimes leave their children with relatives in one place in order to
maintain for the children greater educational and social stability. These
children would not qualify for waivers based on family unity and would
therefore fail to qualify for legalization. Similarly, alien children who
have been placed voluntarily by their parents into foster care might
also be ineligible.
Second, the INS unfairly combines definitional and functional approaches to the term "family." The regulations first take a definitional
approach to what constitutes a family group: the qualifying members
are spouse, unmarried minor children, and parents. 0 3 The regulations
then further narrow membership in the family with functional qualifications: minor children must not be members of some other household
and parents must be residing regularly in the household of the family
group.20 4 Thus it appears that a waiver will not be granted for family
unity unless the excludable alien passes a cumulative test: the alien
must have the requisite degree of kinship and live with the family. For
example, assume a 14-year-old boy, excludable because he assisted another alien in entering the country illegally, 101 lives with his uncle. The
boy will not be considered a member of his father's family group because the boy is functionally part of another family. If, however, the
uncle is also applying for legalization and seeks a waiver on behalf of
201. Id. (disqualifying from the family unit minor children residing in another household, but
not "parents who reside regularly in the household of the family group").
202. Children often live with relatives as an alternative to foster care. Statutes in several
States require that "preference be given to the release of the minor to relatives as opposed to
foster or group homes." FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS, supra note 190, at 8. States commonly exclude relatives from requirements for obtaining a foster care license, in recognition of the
informality and frequency of the practice.
203. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,209 (1987) (to be codifed at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(m)).
204. Id.
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
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his nephew, the application cannot be granted in the name of family
unity because the nephew is not a member of the uncle's biological
family.
This mix of functional and definitional approaches to the term "family" poses a serious obstacle for some undocumented aliens and is contrary to the approach under other sections of the INA concerned with
family unity. For example, a petition for suspension of deportation requires a showing of extreme hardship to the alien "or to his spouse,
parent, or child.""" The Supreme Court made clear in INS v. Hector"'7 that the INS need consider hardship only to those relatives identified and defined by Congress in "unusually detailed and unyielding
provisions." ' 08 In Hector, an aunt petitioned for suspension of deportation on the grounds of extreme hardship to her teenage nieces who lived
with her. While the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that a
niece was not a "child" within the meaning of the statute, the Third
Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether the aunt's
relationship with her nieces was the functional equivalent of a parentchild relationship." 9 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "even if
Hector's relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child
relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the
plain meaning of the statute, precluded this functional approach to de-

fining the term 'child.'

"5210

By requiring that children and parents be part of the same household, the legalization regulations go beyond the "plain meanings" used
in the INA. If the functional approach is being used not as an alternative to the statutory definition of child and parent, but as an additional
requirement, the regulations further serve to prevent undocumented
families from remaining intact in the United States. Grafting the functional requirements of the regulations onto the statutory list of acceptable relationships for purposes of a family unity waiver reduces the
number of aliens eligible for waivers based on family unity. This conglomerate approach to the meaning of parent and child is inconsistent
with other provisions in the INA defining families" and with congressional intent that the legalization program be generously interpreted
12
and applied.
An interpretation consonant with congressional intent might be that
206. Id. § 1254(a)(1) (1982). The spouse, child, or parent must be a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
207. 107 S. Ct. 379 (1986) (per curiam).
208. Id. at 381.
209. Id. at 380-81.
210. Id. at 382.
211. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982) ("Immediate relatives" defined as "children," "spouses,"
and "parents."); id. § 1101(a)(35), (b)(1)-(2) (definitions of "child," "spouse," and "parent").
212. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 note (West Supp. 1987).
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only a functional definition should apply in the amnesty context; that
is, because the regulations do not refer to the usual statutory definitions
of family members, and because the regulations require membership or
residence in a household-a functional measure of family composition-the functional definition alone was intended to apply. This interpretation would allow extended families to apply for waivers based on
family unity on behalf of minor children, such as nephews, living
within the household. Such an interpretation would be particularly appropriate in light of the central role of the extended family within the
21 3
undocumented population.
2.

Humanitarian Purposes

If an undocumented family member fails to meet the unnecessarily
restrictive requirements for the family unity waiver, "humanitarian
purposes" should be invoked as a second line of defense. Humanitarian
grounds have included the prevention of family separations in nonlegalization cases prior to IRCA. For example, the waiver for the fraudulent
entry exclusion 1" provides that aliens who have entered the country
through misrepresentation but who are otherwise admissible may remain if they are the parent, spouse, or child of a citizen or permanent
resident. In construing the meaning of "otherwise admissible," the Supreme Court noted that Congress had decided that "it was more important to unite families and preserve family ties than it was to enforce
strictly the quota limitations or even the many restrictive sections that
are designed to keep undesirable or harmful aliens out of the country."2 The Court concluded that the waiver "was designed to accomplish a humanitarianresult" and "that to give meaning to the statute
in the light of its humanitarianpurpose of preventing the breaking up
of families composed in part at least of American citizens, the conflict
between the circuits must be resolved in favor of the aliens." 2 'e
While the present waiver does not require relationship to an American citizen, many ineligible aliens may in fact have citizen children. All
ineligible aliens will have relatives who have already been granted status as temporary resident aliens and who will eventually be eligible for
citizenship. Congress' "humanitarian desire to keep family units to213. Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794, 798 (3d Cir. 1980) ("extend[ing] the same privilege that
the suspension [of deportation] provision affords the nuclear family to [a] grandmother-headed
family"). But see Zamora-Garcia v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 737 F.2d 488, 493 (5th
Cir. 1984) (weak reluctance to expand section 1254(c)(1) protection to deportable alien housekeeper who raised her employer's two children).
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(0 (1982); see Lee Fook Chuey v. INS, 439 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.
1970) (waiver granted to preserve family unity since "'deportation is a drastic measure and in the
nature of a penalty").
215. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
216. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
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gether"2117 sensibly extends to the legalization context.
3. Public Interest
Familial and public interests coincide on the issue of family unity.
SCIRP recognized that
[t] he reunification of families serves the national interest not only
through the humaneness of the policy itself, but also through the
promotion of the public order and well-being of the nation. Psychologically and socially, the reunion of family members with
their close relatives promotes the health and welfare of the United
States.2 1
In supporting the continuation of the visa system based on kinship,
population specialist Charles Keely has explained that "[t]rying to pit
national interests against family or individual interests as a policy
framework seems to assume that individual welfare of citizens and
strengthening the family unit are somehow at odds with other, unspecified national goals."2 9
Family unity is essential to IRCA's specific purpose, the elimination
of the illegal population. Recognizing that a significant number of the
current undocumented population are relatives of legal residents who
are awaiting visa availability, INS regulations already expressly provide that voluntary departure may be granted indefinitely to aliens
awaiting visa priority dates in the third and sixth preference categories. 2 0 Ineligible family members of legalized aliens are also likely to
remain in the United States. 22 ' Achieving IRCA's purpose of eliminating the illegal population requires respecting family unity. Certainly,
permitting ineligible family members to remain in the United States
greatly benefits the family members, but the elimination of the undocumented subclass benefits the larger public interest as well.
217. Lee Fook Chuey, 439 F.2d at 247 (restating congressional purpose in establishing section
1251(f)).
218. SELECT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 112.
219. C. KEELY, U.S. IMMIGRATION: A POLICY ANALYSIS, PUBLIC ISSUES PAPER OF THE POPULATION COUNCIL 65 (1979).
220. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1987).
221. Legalization of Illegal Immigrants, supra note 168, at 103-04 (prepared statement of
Michael Harpold, President, National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, American
Federation of Government Employees).
[I]tis unrealistic to expect that once having given an alien lawful status in the United
States that the family is going to stay out. A major shortcoming of existing law is an
unrealistic attitude towards the family unit of aliens, spouses and minor children. This has
caused a large build-up of family members already residing illegally in the United States
because of the unavailability of visa numbers for second preference applicants from oversubscribed countries.
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The integrity of alien families is one facet of the larger national interest in preserving and supporting all families. On September 2, 1987,
President Reagan ordered the review of all existing and proposed federal regulations to determine whether they "strengthen or erode the
stability of the family."2'22 The Executive Order establishes as federal
policy the identification and correction of programs which "inadver' s Breaking up families under IRCA erodes
tently hurt the family." 22
both family stability and the "authority and rights of parents in the
education, nurture, and supervision of their children" which the order
seeks to protect. 24 The Executive Order identifies the problem of inadvertent harm to families reflected in IRCA's provisions; the public interest waiver provides a straightforward cure. 25
E.

Consequencesfor Families and for the Legalization Program

The consequences of IRCA's individual eligibility requirement for
applicants with a migratory history of serial arrivals is clear: certain
family members will qualify for legalization and others will not. Undocumented families confronted with the likelihood of separation have
several choices. The family may choose to comply with the law: qualifying members apply, nonqualifying family members leave. 226 The
emotional and economic interdependence within Mexican kinship structures suggests, however, that voluntary compliance is unlikely.
Whether the departure of ineligible relatives is voluntary or forced,
there are constellations of possible separations within the nuclear family. First, one parent may fail to qualify for legalization. If the mother,
the parent more likely to have arrived after 1981, leaves, the family
will be deprived of a wage earner and the primary source of emotional
support.2 2 7 The mother's departure from the family may cause particular stress in view of her essential support function within the family
222. Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188 (1987).
223. U.S. Policies to Get Review of Their Affect on Family, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, at
A14, col. I (quoting Gary Bauer, President Reagan's assistant for policy development).
224. Id.
225. Senator Cranston recently stated:
The issuance of this Executive order highlights the unreasonableness of INS' delay in
establishing a uniform national policy on family unity. [Tjhe INS is clearly out of step
with the Reagan administration's policy in this area, and clearly out of touch with the real
predicament that many applicants for legalization find themselves in ....
133 CONG. REC. S13,731 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987).
226. Kelley & Collett, The Deportation of Mexican Aliens and Its Impact on Family Life, 38
CATHOLIC CHARITIES REV. 169, 169 (1954). The consequences of compliance in 1988 are much
the same as described by the authors in 1954: "separation of unknown duration and economic
deprivation." Id.
227. Rodriguez & Romero, Where's the Amnesty for Women?, L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 1988, § 2,
at 7, col. 3 (editorial) (suggesting that the documentary and psychological barriers to legalization
fall most heavily on women). The consequences of maternal deprivation for children are well
recognized.
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structure, the absence of viable nonfamilial support substitutes, and the
possibility that other members of the child's extended family may be
leaving. The departure of the father disrupts the emotional bond between parent and child and is even more likely to weaken the family
economy as the income of undocumented men is generally higher than
that of undocumented women.22 8
If the undocumented family has reconstituted itself in the United
States after a serial migration, renewed separation between parent and
child comes at particularly high psychological cost. Two primary
causes of mental health problems of children in migration are traumatic separation, usually from the mother, and maladjustments caused
by cultural change or conflict. Many undocumented children have experienced both. The reunification between undocumented parents and
children in the United States is not uncommonly attended by emotional
and behavior problems for the children. 2 9 A second disruption undermines the well-being and developing security of children who have already once experienced parental deprivation.
A second pattern of separation within an undocumented family occurs where only one parent and one child are eligible for legalization.
This configuration intensifies the ineligible child's loss by adding the
separation from a sibling.2 30 Because existing sibling bonds become especially important in the absence of a parent,2 3 the removal of both
parent and sibling as a consequence of IRCA ineligibility may thus
deprive the remaining child of all significant attachments. The importance of maintaining sibling solidarity is well recognized under American law in context of custody determinations where courts and legislatures have made clear that "separation of siblings is disfavored and
should be done under only the most compelling circumstances." 32
228.

Segura, Chicanas and Triple Oppression in the Labor Force, in CHICANA VOICES: INTER47 n.2, 54 (1986); Segura, Labor Market Stratification:
The Chicano Experience, 29 BERKELEY J. OF SOCIOLOGY 57 (1984). A deported father may also
feel demoralized as he has failed to meet his role of supporting the family. A Reinterpretation,
supra note 102, at 473, 478-79. ("Being responsible and providing for one's family are critical in
defining one's manhood. A man who . . .otherwise failed to provide for his family would surely
lose the respect of his family and of the community as well.")
229. Telephone interview with E. Andujo (Nov. 5, 1987) (noting that study of Mexican and
Central American clinical population in Los Angeles indicates that the child's age when the parent migrated, the amount of contact during the separation, the presence of new siblings in the
United States are factors influencing the success of the child's assimilation upon reunification.)
230. The departure of school age children has detrimental consequences for the remaining
adult as children in school, exposed to holidays, customs, and language, are the most important
sources of acculturation for Mexican women in the United States. TWICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN
AMERICAN WOMEN 161-62 (M. Melville ed. 1980).
231. BANK & KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND 123 (1982).
232. Rache v. Bashir, 482 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 1986); Obey v. Degling, 337 N.E. 2d 601,
602 (1975) ("Courts should be reluctant to permit separate custody of siblings. Young brothers
and sisters need each other's strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences, and to separate them, unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful.") (citation
omitted).
SECTIONS OF CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER
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A second alternative for undocumented families is for nonqualifying
family members to remain in the United States illegally while eligible
members legalize. This course of action will most likely reassign a particularly vulnerable class of aliens-women and children-to a shadow
realm where cash payments, unreported crimes, substandard working
conditions, and personal insecurity are the order of each day."' Continuing an illegal presence may also delay or even jeopardize an improved
immigration status for both the undocumented alien and his or her legalized spouse or child. If deported, the disqualified alien cannot enter
the United States for five years,234 a period of time which may exceed
the waiting period for admission as the spouse or child of a permanent
resident alien.23 5
In addition, a legalized alien's knowledge about a relative's illegal
presence may prevent either from ever becoming a permanent resident.
Applicants for legalization must list on INS Form 1-68723 the names
and location of every spouse, former spouse, son, daughter, brother, and
sister, and must further state whether those persons are applying for
legal residence.237 An applicant whose spouse has decided to remain in
the United States illegally may decide not to report that fact to the
INS. But applicants making false statements on applications risk fed233.

See supra notes 62-68, 87-93 and accompanying text; J. CREWDSON, THE

TARNISHED

DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 219-238 (1983) (catalog-

ing "INS raids, unethical immigration lawyers, gouging landlords, dishonest merchants, unscrupulous employers, notarios publicos, and overzealous police officers").
234. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1982).
235. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987) (temporary residents may apply for
permanent resident status 18 months after being granted temporary status).
236. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Application for Status as
a Temporary Resident Under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Form 1-687)
(Apr. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Form 1-687].
237. Id. at 2 (question 32) The form further deters families from participation in the legalization program by reinforcing apprehensions that coming forward will lead to deportation.
Congress attempted to address such fears by providing that except in cases of willful misrepresentation, information furnished on an amnesty application cannot be used for any purpose other
than determining legalization status. 8 U.S.C.A. § I160(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987) (SAWs); id. §
1255a(c)(5) (general amnesty). Despite the statutory protection of confidentiality, skepticism remains following reports of the apprehension of the family members of applicants. Many Illegal
Aliens Wary of Amnesty, Ineligible Relatives May Be Deported, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1987, at
Cl, col. 6. ("Several cases across the country, one them [sic] in the Washington area, in which
INS raided businesses and detained family members of illegal immigrants who have applied for
amnesty, are also spawning this fear of reprisals.").
Despite the courtesy and good faith of many legalization officers, INS officials have not uniformly assumed or adjusted to the new cooperative spirit envisioned by IRCA between the Service
and the undocumented population. For example, INS Western Regional Director Harold Ezell
has made repeated derogatory remarks about undocumented aliens. Immigration's Happy Warrior: California'sHarold Ezell Stirs Praise and Draws Fire, TIME, Jan. 27, 1986, at 23. In calling
for Ezell's removal, Senator Cranston of California noted that Ezell's remarks were likely to
"cause undocumented individuals to hesitate further to reveal themselves to the INS." Letter from
Alan Cranston, United States Senator, to Alan Nelson, Commissioner of the INS (Oct. 14, 1987)
(calling for the removal of Ezell). "Given that the bulk of all legalization applications in the
nation are expected to be filed by California residents, we have the most to lose if this program
fails ....
Because of Mr. Ezell's inflammatory statements ... Hispanics are afraid to put their
fate in this man's hands." Id.
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eral prosecution for fraud 38 or the initiation of deportation proceedings
23 9
against them.
A third possibility is for the whole family to ignore legalization and
remain undocumented. The selection of this option by significant numbers of undocumented families has had a big impact on the success of
the entire legalization program. Legalization applicants are fewer than
the INS had expected. 240 Inadequate educational efforts, hefty up front
fees, strict documentation requirements, applicant mistrust of the INS,
"wait and see" strategies, and even the vague early administrative
problems suggested by the INS contributed to the low rates of participation. But the absence of derivative status appears to be the most influential factor, and one whose impact was clearly predicted.
In its comments on proposed IRCA regulations the United States
Catholic Conference stated that "[flor a substantial proportion, perhaps even a majority, of the undocumented population, [family unity]
is the primary criterion upon which the decision to apply for legalization will be made." ' " That prediction has proved accurate. Many eligible aliens are not applying for legalization "for fear that the immigration service will break up families in which some members are eligible
'
for amnesty and others are not."242
The INS does not acknowledge this. Commissioner Nelson has
stated that because 85% of the applicants in the first five and one half
months of the legalization program were filed directly with the INS,
not with Qualified Designated Entities (QDE), "there is no 'fear factor.' ",24 Representatives of qualified designated entities, on the other
238. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(c)(6) (West Supp. 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(t)(4)) (INS determination of fraud to be referred to the U.S. Attorney
for prosecution).
239. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(t)(4)) ("initiation of
deportation proceedings in lieu of prosecution"). The information obtained in a "granted legalization application" is subject to further INS review "in reference to future benefits applied for
(including petitions for naturalization and permanent resident status for relatives)." Id. (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(t)(5)).
240. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
241. Review of the Early Implementation, supra note 13, at 9 (prepared statement of Rev.
Msgr. Nicholas DiMarzio, Exec. Dir., Migration and Refugee Services, United States Catholic
Conference).
242. Amnesty: INS Plan Faltering,S.F. Exam. & Chron., Nov. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (20% to
50% of eligible aliens in San Francisco Bay Area not applying because of family unity issue);
Nat'l Assoc. Latino Elected & Appointed Officials, Fear Continues to Plague Legalization Program (Nov. 5, 1987) (press release) (noting that NALEO survey in 9 States reveals 36% of potential legalization applicants claim fear of the U.S. government or the possible deportation of ineligible family members keeps them from applying).
243. A. Nelson, Legalization and Family Fairness-An Analysis (Oct. 21, 1987) [hereinafter
A. Nelson, Family Fairness] (Supplementary Information for the Appearance Before the House
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Int'l Law, Immigration Reform and Control Act, Oversight Hearing). The number of people filing with the INS explains little without data on the
number of people deciding not to file at all. In addition, filing with the INS may not mean the
applicants have gone directly to the INS; the families may have first paid some immigration advisor to prepare the forms or evaluate the likelihood of success. It is also likely that those with the
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hand, believe that poor public education and lack of local advertising
more accurately explain why fewer aliens than expected have turned to
QDEs for assistance. 4 4
Finally, the INS defends the success of legalization through a revisionistic lowering of the numerical estimates of those once thought eligible for legalization-down from 3.9 million to 2 million persons. 2"
Downscaling the projections avoids confronting the issue of why 1.9
million aliens may not be applying. Survey data clearly reveal, however, that for many undocumented aliens the reason is fear of family

separation. 2"
III.

REMEDIES

Three standard approaches-legislative, administrative, and judicial-are available to remedy the problem of family separations caused
by IRCA's failure to extend derivative status to the children and

spouses of legalized aliens. Of these, existing INS administrative procedures are likely to be the most efficacious, not only because they apply

with particular force in the area of family unity, but because the
probability of success for either a political or judicial cure is dim.247
Because the legalization program passed the Congress only narrowly,
and as part of a delicately constructed bundle of compromises, congres-

sional finetuning of particular provisions is politically unlikely.

8

And

surest cases, those who truly had nothing to fear because of the strength of their applications,
would file first and with the INS. Amnesty Requests by Aliens Decline, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988,
§ 1, at A12, col. 5 (likelihood that applicants with weakest cases have not yet applied).
244. Amnesty: INS Plan Faltering, S.F. Exam. & Chron., Nov. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. On the other hand, certain powerful interest groups, such as the United States Catholic
Conference, have concluded that "(b)ecause efforts to resolve the family separation issue through
administrative accommodation have been unsuccessful . . . only a mandate of Congress will provide relief." United States Catholic Conference, Legislative Monitor 5 (Oct. 1987). Recognizing
that "the politics of these bills will be difficult, the United States Catholic Conference will be
developing alternative legislation to confer an interim status on ineligible family members in the
nature of extended voluntary departure or deferred action status pending such time as the eligible
members can petition for legal immigration." Id.
248. Several bills introduced during the first session of the 100th Congress sought to ensure
family unity. S. 1408, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S13,727 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987)
(introduced on the Senate floor as Amendment No. 894) (absolute waiver of continuous residence
requirement for spouses and children of legalized aliens); H.R. 1813, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (absolute waiver of continuous residence requirement for spouses and children of legalized
aliens); H.R. 1812, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (absolute waiver of continuous residence requirement for "an alien who is the parent of a child who (i) is a citizen of the United States and
(ii) was born after December 31, 1981, and before November 7, 1986"). During debate on S.
1408 (Amendment No. 894), Senator Simpson argued that any proposed legislative remedy for
family disruptions caused by IRCA would be politically unavailing:
The amendment disturbs me because it destroys the delicate balance of the recently passed
legislation ....
The amnesty provision only passed the U.S. House of Representatives by seven votes. ...
Legalization was nearly stricken from the bill . . . . So it is the least popular part of
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despite its fundamental importance under the Constitution, 4 9 the issue

of family unity for aliens is but another area where "[in the exercise
of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."2 5
[IRCA].
We have already grappled with and anguished over the legalization issue and conclusively decided it.
133 CONG. REC. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987). For the vigorous Senate debate on October 7,
1987, see id. at S13,727-39. S. 1408 (Amendment No. 894) was tabled 55-45 on October 7, 1987.
id. at S13,739.
In the last days of the 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Representative Edward Roybal of California
attempted "to ensure the unity of families having a member who is eligible for legal immigration
under [the general amnesty or special amnesty for SAWs]." HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM.,
FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1988, H.R. REP. No. 415, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1987). In describing his efforts, Senator Roybal noted that
Concerns have been raised that ineligible family members are subject to deportation, and
that the fear of separation is a disincentive to apply that threatens the success of the IRCA
programs that confer legal immigration status. Accordingly, the Attorney General is required to treat spouses and children of those eligible for legal resident status under IRCA
uniformly and humanely, by granting them protection from deportation. The [INS] is directed to grant these individuals work authorization and rights to travel abroad.
Id. Representative Roybal introduced an amendment to the session's continuing appropriations
resolution. H.R.J. Res. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1987) (stricken). In its final form as
defeated in conference, the amendment ordered the INS to use no funds to deport "an alien who
is, and has been since on or before November 6, 1986, the spouse or child of an alien who, after
that date, becomes a legalized person." 133 CONG. REc. H12,039 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987). By its
terms the amendment did not provide for the protection of amnesty-ineligible parents. See supra
notes.
The history of the Roybal amendment demonstrates the difficulties of obtaining a legislative
remedy. "The full House had adopted the continuing resolution with the family unity amendment
intact by a vote of 248 to 170. The Senate did not include such a provision in its version of the
bill, and the House conferees receded to that position." 133 CONG. REC. H12,038 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1987) (statement of Rep. Roybal). Senator Simpson, who was not a conferee, nevertheless
"took it upon himself to address the conferees ... succeeded in overriding the broad support the
substitute family unity amendment had from other immigration experts and legislators." Id. (statment of Rep. Roybal). "The issue has been put to rest for this year, but I can assure you it will be
raised again in the next Congress." Id. (statement of Rep. Roybal).
249. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (protecting the "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their children"); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (adoption of child upon consent of only the mother denies equal
protection to unwed father); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(exclusion of cousins from definition of family for purposes of zoning restrictions impermissible
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(statutory presumption that unwed fathers unfit to care for their children violates due process).
Family integrity is also contemplated in State joint custody statutes, premised on the concept
that it is in the best interests of children to maintain a family relationship with parents, even upon
dissolution of the marriage. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (Deering Supp. 1986) ("It is the
public policy of this state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both
parents.").
250. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976); see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797-800
(1977) (citizen father barred from petitioning for the admission of his illegitimate alien son because their relationship was excluded from the definitions of "parent" and "child" under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(b)(l)-(2) (1982)). But see Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) (suspension of deportation considerations).
The importance and centrality of the family in American life is firmly established both in
our traditions and in our jurisprudence. . . . It is against this background that the BIA

1987]

FAMILY UNIFICATION

Because the problem of family unity is more likely to be cured by

administrative remedies than by legislative amendments or judicial interpretations, this Part focuses on the unspectacular but practical administrative mechanisms to provide direct and timely relief to undocumented families.25 1 All three remedy categories are, however, guided by
a fourth source of law, international human rights law. Recognized inmust examine the eligibility of an alien to remain in this country when his or her deportation might result in the break-up of a family or otherwise cause hardship to a "spouse,
"
parent, or child, who is a citizen . . . or permanent residenft] ..
Id. at 1423; Vasquez v. INS, 767 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (burden of proof in suspension of
deportation) (mere existence of a citizen spouse is not prima facie extreme hardship, but where
record proves more than "mere existence" the burden to explain why family separation is not a
sufficient hardship falls on the government) (called into doubt in Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1985)); Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1979) (burden of proof in suspension of deportation) (holding that "[wihere a father expresses deep affection for his child and
where the record demonstrates that his actions are consistent with and supportive of his expression
of affection, a finding of no extreme hardship will not be affirmed by this court unless the reasons
for such a finding are made clear"); 8 U.S.C.A. § l101(b)(l)(D) (West Supp. 1987) (IRCA
supersedes Fiallo). Thus, the fact that an undocumented parent and child have been living together as an intact family may reflect the necessary degree of affection to compel discretionary
relief in a legalization case. See id. §§ 1255a(f), 1160(e) (administrative and judicial review of
deportation orders arising out of an application for adjustment of status under IRCA's amnesty
provisions).
251. The three administrative remedies discussed in detail below are voluntary departure, deferred action status, and extended voluntary departure. Two other more limited but potentially
useful mechanisms are suspension of deportation and asylum and withholding of deportation.
Suspension of Deportation
Generally, the Attorney General may suspend the deportation and adjust to permanent resident
status of an alien who has been physically present in the United States for at least seven years,
who is of good moral character, and whose deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to
himself or his spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen or permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. §
1254(a)(1) (1982). Adjustment to temporary resident status under IRCA's general amnesty requires five years' uninterrupted residence. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987); see
supra note . Three other reasons make suspension of deportation inapplicable to the undocumented family. First, few suspensions are granted to aliens from Mexico. Second, extreme hardship is difficult to prove, especially since economic detriment alone does not satisfy the requirement. See Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1982). Third, proving extreme
hardship is a disproportionately heavier burden than proving visa eligibility under the kinship
preference categories. Suspension cases, however, provide important examples of careful judicial
consideration of family separation.
Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
Aliens in the United States who have a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" may apply for
asylum. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1982) (defining "refugee"). Successful applicants, or asylees,
may remain in the United States, eligible after one year to adjust to permanent resident status. Id.
§ 1159(a)(l)-(2). An alien who can show that his "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of the same five asylum rationales can petition for a withholding of deportation. Because
asylum and withholding of deportation require a fear of persecution or death, they are unavailable
to most undocumented aliens from Mexico or Central America, considercd by the Reagan Administration to be economic migrants, not political refugees. See generally Stay of Deportation for
Undocumented Salvadorans and Nicaraguans: Hearing on H.R. 618 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Internat'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Stay of Deportation] (comment on bill providing for stays of deportation, or extended voluntary departure for the class, pending GAO investigation of conditions in
Nicaragua and El Salvador); Note, Political Bias in United States Refugee Policy Since the
Refugee Act of 1980, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 495 (1986) (concluding that "refugee policy continues
to be influenced by foreign policy considerations in the areas of annual admissions, asylum adjudications, and determinations concerning extended voluntary departure").
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creasingly in Federal and State courts,2 52 international human rights
law has been used to advance and delineate the rights of aliens in the
United States. 253 Because international law affirms the family as the
basic component of society and mandates its protection as an essential
human right, its invocation is especially appropriate in family unity
cases arising under IRCA.
A.

Administrative Remedies

Under present INS policy, each district director is authorized to decide family unity cases on a "case-by-case basis.1 25 4 There are several
problems with this system of handling family unification cases. The
first is that it is not a system. With the small exception provided under
the recently announced Family Fairness guidelines,25 5 discussed below,
there is no uniformity either in the form of the remedy selected,2 6 in
the specific criteria used to decide a case, 257 or in any guiding presump252. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (indeterminate detention of Cuban entrant found to violate customary international law as provided for in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 592 (E.D. Tex.
1978) (invoking the Protocol of Buenos Aires, as evidence of "the federal government's commitment to expanding educational opportunity," to strike down Texas statute excluding undocumented children from public school), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aFf'd, 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
254. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1987).
255. A. Nelson, Family Fairness, supra note 243, at supplementary information. Commissioner Nelson asserted that "legalization itself is the most significant effort of the Congress and
the Administration to pursue the goal of U.S. immigration laws-family unification." Id. at 6.
Even the vocabulary surrounding the family unity issue has taken on political significance. The
INS uses the term "family fairness" to underscore its position that "[flairness dictates that illegal
alien family members of persons eligible for legalization not be treated more favorably than the
family members of legal permanent residents who may have to wait years to come to the United
States due to the backlog of a demand for visas." Id. at 4. On the other hand, Senator Chaffee
titled S. 1408, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S13,727 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987), the
"Humanitarian Family Unity Act." In floor debate on this bill, however, Senator Simpson remarked as follows: "I think there has been such tremendous discussion and passionately so, of the
issue of family unity, and that it is supposed to be the high ground of the issue. I think it is, but if
we refer to it more honestly as the second amnesty, I think that might offset the advantage of the
words used of family unity." Id. at S13,734-35.
256. Compare Letter from Raymond B. Penn, INS District Director, Baltimore, Maryland to
Carol Sanger (Aug. 26, 1987) (citing the "service policy to consider each case on an individual
basis, i.e., 8 CFR 242.5 guidelines for voluntary departure") with Letter from Joseph R. Greene,
Acting INS District Director, Portland, Oregon to Carol Sanger (June 15, 1987):
Besides the voluntary departure provisions of the Immigration Law, there are indeed other
forms of discretionary relief for which guidelines are already set forth, e.g. Deferred Action
in Operations Instructions 242.1(a)(22). However, I have no indication at this time that
these options will be used to address the ineligible family member questions. On the other
hand, it is and has been the position of the INS that no mass deportations will result from
the passage of this law.
Both letters are available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal.
257. Compare INS Memo from Commissioner A. Nelson (Nov. 13, 1987), reprinted in 64
Inter. Rel. 1380-81 (Dec. 14, 1987) (app. I) (stating that family members "statutorily entitled to
such discretionary relief" are not precluded from applying for voluntary departure) with A. Nelson, Family Fairness, supra note 243, at 5 (announcing that ineligible spouses of legalized aliens
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tions regarding generosity. 6 In addition to the application of varying
standards, a survey by the American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) revealed that "most district directors have declined to exercise

[discretionary] authority in the absence of more specific guidance from
the [INS] Central Office." 2 9 Thus, the lack of uniformity and initiative among the district directors means that jurisdictional fortuity may
determine whether a family remains together or not.26 0 The absence of
uniform, announced standards poses a second problem: undocumented

families cannot make informed decisions on what action might be in
either the individual or collective interest of the family members.
On October 21, 1987, INS Commissioner Alan Nelson announced a

limited national policy on family unity. The Family Fairness guidelines
provide that:
In general, indefinite voluntary departure shall be granted to
unmarried children under the age of eighteen (18) years who can

establish that they were in an unlawful status prior to November
6, 1986. Such children should be residing with their parents and
the granting of voluntary departure should be conditioned on the

fact that both parents (or, in the case of a single parent household, the parent the child lives with) have achieved lawful tempo-

rary resident status.261

In short, the policy does not cover any child who has an ineligible parent. The guidelines apply in the unlikely situtation where both parents
have been in the United States since 1981, the mother sometime after
1981 returned to Mexico to deliver her baby and remained in Mexico

for a period uninterruptive of IRCA's continuous residence requirement. 262 The guidelines also apply in cases where both parents entered
must show "compelling and humanitarian factors" beyond marriage itself to receive voluntary
departure). Neither announcement defined "compelling and humanitarian factors."
258. In written replies to a written request for "criteria to apply to family unity cases which
arise in the context of legalization," Model Letter from Carol Sanger to District Directors (June
9, 1987) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal), few district directors
offered exactly the same criteria, except for those who responded by merely restating that family
unity decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis. See generally Letters from District Directors to Carol Sanger (summer 1987) (available on file at the Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal).
259. Letter from Warren R. Leiden, Exec. Dir., American Immigration Lawyers Association
to Commissioner Alan C. Nelson, INS (Oct. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Leiden Letter].
260. See generally'Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection,and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987) (arguing that geographical differences in legal standards
preclude uniformity of law in a manner that sometimes violates equal protection).
261. A. Nelson, Family Fairness, supra note 243, at 5 (emphasis added),
262. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987) (continuous unlawful residence since
before Jan. 1, 1982). The continuous residence requirement for adjustment to temporary resident
status is met if no one absence exceeded 45 days or if return to the United States was prevented
by emergency reasons. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,208 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i));
id. at 16,212 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(l)(i)). The aggregate of all absences may not
exceed 180 days between Jan. 1, 1982 and the application date. Id. at 16,208 (to be codified at 8
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the United States together before 1982 and subsequently sent for minor
children. The guidelines do not apply, however, for children separated
from only one parent or from a sibling, or for separations between
spouses, and have been regarded as "a victory for advocates of restrictive immigration policies."2 ' The issue of how to remedy family sepa-

rations for most undocumented families remains.
1. Voluntary Departure
Aliens with amnesty-ineligible spouses and children want to keep
their families intact. This requires physical and economic security. Voluntary departure, structured to provide both relief from deportation

and work authorization, is a sensible and familiar solution.
Voluntary departure means that an alien subject to deportation volunteers or agrees to leave the country, rather than be deported." 4 Cer-

tain features make this form of relief especially appropriate in family
unity cases. First, while grants of voluntary departure generally permit
the departing alien no more than 30 days to leave the country, extensions may be given "under meritorious circumstances. 2 0 5 Certain
aliens, such as those awaiting visa availability, or those "in whose case
the district director has determined there are compelling factors," may
remain in renewable yearly increments. 6 Indeed, the Family Fairness
guidelines indicate that voluntary departure can be granted on an indefinite basis;26 7 presumably, under the guidelines, eligible children will
remain in the United States until they receive immigrant visas. Second,
C.F.R. § 245a.I(c)(1)(i)); id. at 16,212 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(I)(i)).
IRCA also requires that an applicant for temporary resident status establish having been "continously physically present in the United States since [IRCA's] enactment." 8 U.S.C.A. §
1255a(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1987). "An alien shall not be considered to have failed to maintain
continuous physical presence in the United States for purposes of [§ 1255a(a)(3)(A)] by virtue of
brief, casual, and innocent absences from the United States." Id. § 1255a(a)(3)(B) (superseding
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)).
IRCA contains a similar continuous residence requirement for applicants adjusting from temporary resident status to permanent resident status. Id. § 1255(b); see 52 Fed. Reg. 16,212 (1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(c)(2)).
263. Amnesty Rules Eased to Let Children Stay in U.S. with Parents Who Qualify, Wall St.
J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 20, col. 2 (noting that Comm'r Nelson "characterized the debate as a 'family
fairness' issue, rather than a question of 'family unity' ").
264. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation proceedings, other than [several categories of excludable aliens) to depart voluntarily from the
United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral
character for at least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure under this subsection.
Id.
265.
266.

8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1987).
Id. § 242.5(a)(2)(viii)-(3) (1987); see 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.2a, at 7-18 (1979) (noting the incidents of the privilege).
267. See supra note 261.
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aliens who have shown compelling factors may be granted work authorization,2 6 ' an essential component in light of the economic need of

many undocumented families.26 9
Voluntary departure benefits the INS as well. An announced policy

of voluntary departure for ineligible family members might induce
aliens to surrender themselves to the INS and affirmatively request voluntary departure and work authorization. The INS would then be able
to maintain administrative control over aliens otherwise likely to remain unidentified, as under current regulations an alien granted voluntary departure must report yearly to renew the status.2 70 This would
advance the INS' goal of establishing control over the illegal
population.
Voluntary departure also responds to congressional concerns. A re-

peated objection to permitting ineligible family members to remain in
the United States has been the perceived unfairness of advancing undocumented aliens in front of the relatives of those who entered legally
in the line for immigrant admissions or visas. 7 1 But voluntary depar268. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,227-28 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(12)) (pertaining
to aliens who must apply for employment authorization). The INS has enumerated certain
"If]actors which may be considered in adjudicating the employment application of an alien who
has been granted voluntary departure" on the basis of compelling factors:
(i) The length of voluntary departure granted;
(ii) The existence of a dependent spouse and/or children in the United States who rely on
the alien for support;
(iii) Whether there is a reasonable chance that legal status may ensue in the near future;
and
(iv) Whether there is a reasonable basis for consideration of discretionary relief.
Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(12)(i)-(iv)).
269. Other features of voluntary departure are that one may apply for it at any time before
the commencement of deportation proceedings. 52 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1987) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 242.5(b)). "An appeal shall not lie from a denial of an application for voluntary departure . . . but the denial shall be without prejudice to the alien's right to apply for relief from
deportation under any provision of law." 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(b) (1987).
270. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1987); see A. Nelson, Family Fairness, supra note 243, at (providing that ineligible family members granted voluntary departure "should be placed under docket
control"). Docket control denotes the internal INS system for monitoring aliens who are in some
stage of a proceeding with the INS, but have not yet left the country.
271. In debate on S. 1408, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (reported on floor as Amendment
No. 894), a bill to give derivative status to the immediate family of a legal temporary resident,
Senator Simpson argued:
The cruel irony of this amendment, and it is very real, is that it will treat illegal, undocumented immigrants more generously than we treat legal immigrants in the United States.
Under our present legal immigration system a new permanent resident alien who does
not enter with his immediate family members has to apply through the preference system
for his entire family to immigrate.
In such cases there is a wait for 16 months for the nationals of most countries and longer
waits in countries of high visa demand: Mexico, Philippines, some other Asian countries-which can be 6, 8, or even 10 years. I am talking now about legal immigration, not
illegal immigration.
As the newly legalized aliens receive permanent resident alien status, then they may
apply for the admission of their family members in the same manner . . ..
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ture does not move the relatives of legalized aliens ahead in the line. In
fact, amnesty-ineligible family members granted voluntary departure
cannot even get on the visa line until 19 months after the legalized
alien is granted temporary resident status. 72 Thus, while voluntary departure permits family members to remain in the country while awaiting their visas, it neither speeds up nor advances the process by which
they can become legal permanent residents. Relatives of legal immigrants will receive their visas, citizenship, and right to petition for other
relatives before any family member granted voluntary departure.
Moreover, voluntary departure does not alter IRCA's basic scheme.
The INS has stated that "the Service cannot use the regulatory process
to substitute its judgment for that of Congress and grant the equivalent
of derivative status through any existing mechanisms such as voluntary
departure."'7' But voluntary departure is not an "equivalent of derivative status." Voluntary departure is a significantly lesser benefit than
legalization, which can be converted into permanent residency and, ultimately, into citizenship. A thoughtful voluntary departure package
combining the goals of the INS, the needs of ineligible family members, and the concerns of Congress has been proposed to the INS by
AILA.27 4 The proposal provides that "INS district directors should
grant one year, renewable voluntary departure and work authorization
to qualified aliens on a case-by-case basis." 75 The case-by-case determinations would assure that no alien remains who is disqualified from
eventual permanent resident status under the INA. The AILA proposal
represents a uniform policy, not a blanket relief. It also makes clear
that immediate relatives granted voluntary departure are not eligible
for legalization and gain no special petition right or preference under
applicable immigration laws.
2.

Deferred Action Status

Deferred action is a form of discretionary relief in which the INS
assigns a case an internal priority so low that the alien is never deported: it effectively stays a deportation indefinitely. 76 Current INS
133 CONG. REC. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987); see supra note 4 (time attributes of temporary
resident status).
272. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
273. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,207 (Summary).
274. Leiden Letter, supra note 259.
275. Id.; W. Leiden, Proposal to Preserve Family Unity for Immediate Relatives of Legalization Applicants (addendum to Leiden Letter, supra note 259) ("The presumption should be that
all qualified individuals would receive this relief unless clearly ineligible for later lawful permanent residence.").
276. INS, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 242.1(a)(22) (1984) (formerly OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 103.1(a)(l)(ii)). "The district director may, in his or her discretion, recommend consideration of deferred action, an act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority and in no
way an entitlement, in appropriate cases." Id. See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
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rules list four factors to be considered by a district director in making a
deferred action determination: the likelihood of ultimately removing
the alien; the presence of sympathetic factors; the likelihood of adverse
publicity; and the alien's membership in a class of deportable aliens
with a high deportation enforcement priority.27 7 Each of these four factors has particular applicability to family members deportable under
IRCA.
The likelihood of removing ineligible family members is a peculiar
calculation in the legalization context. Legalized aliens are first granted
temporary resident status, and after nineteen months from receipt of

that status may apply for permanent resident status.2 78 As permanent
residents they may then petition for the admission of spouses and un-

married sons and daughters under the second preference.2 79 Thus, while
the amnesty-ineligible family members can be deported now, they are
likely to return legally as second preference immigrants: requiring their
immediate departure from the United States thus makes little sense.
The "presence of sympathetic factors" under the INS rules is directly implicated in cases of family separation. Deportable children,
having been born after January 1, 1982 outside the United States, are
a group particularly worthy of sympathy. Deporting five-year-olds is
likely to generate a large amount of adverse publicity, thus triggering

the third factor under the INS internal rules for deferred action.
While it is difficult to calculate which of IRCA's effects has generated the most adverse publicity, the disruption of families, recognized
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.3e (1976 & Supps. 1981 & 1985) (noting that nonpriority status or deferred action status is a misnomer: an alien granted such status is practically
immune from further action).
An alien has no entitlement to deferred action status. The Circuit Courts of Appeal strongly
disagreed as to whether OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 103.1(a)(1)(ii) conferred a substantive right
upon aliens, Compare Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the rule
"confers a substantive benefit upon the alien") with Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 659, 662
(1 th Cir. 1983) (holding that the instruction confers no substantive benefit) and Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 732 F.2d 792, 797 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (implying that the instruction does not
create a protected interest). The 1981 amendment of the instruction expressly disavows the crea-

tion of any entitlement. INS,

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

242.1(a)(22) (1984); see Romeiro de

Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (amendment of the instruction obviates need to
overrule Nicholas in denial of deferred action status); see also Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813
F.2d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 1987) (amendment of OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS constitutes general
statement of policy by INS; therefore the amendment may not be challenged for failure to comply
with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act).
277. INS, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 242.1(a)(22)(A)-(D) (1984). See generally Wildes,
The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and NaturalizationService Goes Public. The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 42, 42-43 (1976) (INS
criteria became available when former Beatle John Lennon filed FOIA request in pursuit of nonpriority status).
278. See supra note 4 (describing adjustment to permanent resident status under the general
amnesty and under the special amnesty for SAWs).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982) (spouses and unmarried children of lawfully admitted permanent residents given second preference in visa allocations after unmarried children of citizens
who are admitted in first preference).
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by interest groups prior to IRCA's implementation, and increasingly by
the press thereafter,'" remains a strong candidate. During the legalization program's first months of operation, there were fewer actual separations than expected, 28 ' in part because fewer aliens have applied for
legalization than expected. 28 In addition, the number of denials of legalization applications has been small, perhaps because the INS is delaying the announcement of denials to avoid bad publicity283 and because only the best cases are presenting themselves.28 4 Legalization
workers report that the fear of denial for the applicant or a family
member is a significant factor in the decision not to apply.28 5 In this
odd way, the intensity of the problem-the disincentive to apply-has
suppressed its emergence. As patterns or policies in the different districts become established and known, families will likely come forward.
Because no deportations may result from information acquired during
the legalization process, deportation proceedings against family members will likely begin late in the legalization period. While separations
may then produce sufficient adverse publicity to warrant grants of deferred action status, the delay in the establishment of the policy
reduces its usefulness in resolving the immediate need of undocumented
families to decide whether or not to apply.
The fourth factor in granting deferred action status focuses on the
magnitude of the aliens' wrongdoing. Are the ineligible members of the
undocumented family within a class of aliens distinguished by its high
deportation enforcement priority? If ineligible family members are
characterized by their illegal immigration status, then the sense of
Congress that "the immigration laws of the United States should be
enforced vigorously ' 28 6 suggests that the answer may be yes. This interpretation, however, renders the phrase "high enforcement priority"
near meaningless, as every deportable alien is in some violation of the
280. See 133 CONG. REC. S13,738-39 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987) (list of articles reprinted).
281. See Many Immigrants Face Divided Family, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, Part 1,at 20,
col. 4.
282. See supra note 4.
283. See NORTH, supra note 148, at 20. In the Virgin Islands Legalization Program the INS
decided to postpone negative decisions on applications as long as possible "in order not to discourage applicants from coming forward." Id. From this decision North draws the following lesson:
"The public relations tactic of postponing negative decisions to the end of the program probably
has merit in the Mainland, except in aggravated cases. One of the many problems with the British
amnesties were some well-publicized deportations (unusual events anyway in the UK) of unsuccessful applicants for adjustment." There is no evidence that the INS under IRCA is repeating its
Virgin Islands tactic; nevertheless, the number of denials, the length of time to decide them, and
the timing of their announcements should be quantified and reviewed at the program's end.
284. Amnesty Programfor Illegal Aliens Gaining Momentum, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at
A l, col. 2.
285. Amnesty Requests by Aliens Decline, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, § 1,at 1,col. I (noting
that "the biggest barrier to broader participation is a failure to clarify the status of family members who are ineligible for amnesty on their own").
286. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 note (West Supp. 1987).
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immigration laws of the United States. The INS considers dangerous
criminals, large-scale alien smugglers, drug traffickers, terrorists, war
criminals, and habitual immigration violators as examples of aliens
with high deportation enforcement priorities. 8 7 Illegal presence alone
does not sensibly warrant the promotion of an alien to this INS "most
288
wanted" list.
If, however, undocumented family members are characterized by
their status within a family, they are distinguished by their high admission, not deportation, priority. Focusing on the alien's family status is
consonant with the more refined sense of Congress that in the vigorous
enforcement of the immigration laws, "the Attorney General shall take
due and deliberate actions necessary to safeguard the constitutional
rights, personal safety, and human dignity of United States citizens
and aliens. ' 28 9 Certainly the unnecessary separation of undocumented
aliens from their families depreciates the rights, safety, and dignity of
these aliens and, in many-cases, their citizen children.
The INS recognized the senselessness of requiring the departure
from the United States of aliens eventually entitled to remain in the
country in Silva v. Bell.290 Between 1968 and 1976, 144,999 Cuban
refugees were granted permanent resident status as provided for in the
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.291 The visa numbers used in these adjustments of status were charged against the Western Hemisphere immigration quota, thus reducing the number of visas available to immigrant applicants from all other Western Hemisphere countries. In 1976
the INS acknowledged its charging policies had been in error. The issue litigated in Silva was how the recaptured visa numbers should be
distributed among Western Hemisphere applicants whose admission to
the United States had been displaced as a result of the wrongful
charging.292
The district court ordered that the recaptured numbers would be allocated among class members in percentages reflecting historical visa
distribution patterns among Western Hemisphere countries.2 9" To protect class members already in the United States from having to leave at
the expiration of their temporary visas only to return upon being allocated a recaptured number, the court issued an injunction against the
287. INS, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 242.1(a)(22)(D).
288. Id.
289. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 note (West Supp. 1987).
290. 605 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1979).
291. An Act to Adjust the Status of Cuban Refugees, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161,
1161 (1966).
292. 605 F.2d at 979-80.
293. Within each national group recaptured visa numbers would be made available to applicants chronologically according to priority dates. 605 F.2d at 989. The class had earlier been
defined as all persons from the Western Hemisphere with priority dates between July I, 1968 and
December 31, 1976, the period when the wrongful charging occurred. Id.
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deportation of Silva class members, until all recaptured numbers had
been distributed. Notice of the injunction was explained to class members in the form of "Silva letters." 2 9 Silva letter holders were authorized to remain and work in the United States until all the recaptured
numbers had been assigned, at which time they would return to their
prior immigration status.29 5
Spouses and unmarried children of aliens awaiting legalization
should be accorded a status similar to that of the Silva letter holders.
Ineligible family members of legalized aliens should remain in the
United States and in no case be deported pending the outcome of an
alien's application. Failing to qualify for amnesty delays but does not
prevent the admission of non-qualifying family members. To require
their departure yet provide for ultimate reunification is to repeat the
foolhardiness rejected in Silva.
Moreover, 32% of all nonpriority or deferred action status cases
before 1975 were granted to prevent the separation of families. 9 6 Relevant factors in these cases included the educational welfare of the children and the economic hardship to the family in losing a wage-earner,
factors that arise in many legalization cases.29 7 Deferred action status
has been granted to prevent family separations regardless of whether
the parents were married, 98 the immigration status of the alien's family members, 99 or the reasons why the alien was being deported.30 0 In
legalization cases the deportable alien will have at least one legal resident relative, and in many cases citizen siblings or children as well. The
only reason for the deportation of an amnesty-ineligible family member
is the alien's undocumented status. In sum, amnesty-ineligible family
members easily fall within the pattern of INS decisions recognizing the
appropriateness of deferred action status to prevent the break-up of the
family.
294.

Miller v. INS, 762 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1985). The letters stated:

Due to court order in Silva v. Levi 76-C-4268 entered by District Judge John H. Grady in
the District Court for the Northern District, Illinois, we are taking no action on this case
until further notice from the Court. This means you are permitted to remain in the United
States without threat of deportation or expulsion until further notice.
In view of this order, employment is authorized by this Service as of this date.

Id. at 22.
295. Luciano-Vincente v. INS, 786 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1986); Bagues-Valles v. INS, 779 F.2d
483 (9th Cir. 1985); Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673.(7th Cir. 1985); Miller v. INS, 762
F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1985).
296. Wildes, supra note 277, at 53 n.36 (without citation). The percentage may be greater:
status grants to "the elderly, the young, the mentally incompetent, and the infirm" are analyzed
by Wildes as separate categories, even though many of these grants involved elements of family
separation. Id. at 58.
297. Id. at 59.
298. Id. at 60.
299. Id.
300. Id. Nonpriority status has been granted to prostitutes, Communists, and drug offenders.
Id. at 51.
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3. Extended Voluntary Departure
Since 1960 the INS has in several instances declined to deport
groups of aliens because of disturbed conditions in their home country.
This reprieve from deportation is called extended voluntary departure.30 1 It offers temporary refuge in the United States to all members
of a class of aliens who are in the United States. 30 2 Although extended
voluntary departure has been used primarily in cases where hazardous
conditions in a country of origin would endanger returning nationals, it
has also been used in cases where family separations would result from
the deportation of a discrete class of family members. The Virgin Islands Nonimmigrant Alien Adjustment Act of 198203 authorized
aliens admitted to the Virgin Islands as temporary H-2 workers before
June 30, 1975 to adjust to permanent resident status.30 4 During the
application process, a class of aliens ineligible for adjustment under the
Act, but ultimately eligible for admission under other INA sections,
emerged. The class consisted of the children of H-2 workers who had
either not arrived or not stayed continuously in the Virgin Islands since
before June 30, 1975.305 Because an adjusting H-2 relative would almost immediately be able to petition for the ineligible children under
the second preference category, the children's ultimate admission was
ensured. The INS granted extended voluntary departure to the class of
children, enabling them to stay in the Virgin Islands. 06
Granting extended voluntary departure to the class of ineligible family members under IRCA appropriately mitigates the harshness of the
Act. Like the children of H-2 workers in the Virgin Islands, the family
members of aliens legalized under IRCA will obtain a legal status in
301. See generally Note, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General's
Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1986) [hereinafter Note, EVD]. Extended voluntary departure is an extra-statutory form of relief based on the prosecutorial discretion of the Att'y Gen., after consultation with the State Dep't. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part, 804 F.2d 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g granted, 808 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The power to grant extended voluntary departure derives from the Executive's plenary authority under the Constitution
to conduct foreign affairs, and from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which empowers the Att'y Gen. to "'establish such regulations ... and perform such other acts ... necessary
for carrying out his authority.' " Id. at 505-06 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982)).
Extended voluntary departure has been granted approximately fifteen times since 1960, when
the Att'y Gen. decreed that Cuban nationals could remain in the United States regardless of their
visa status. It has since been granted to nationals from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Cambodia,
Vietnam, Laos, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Poland. Id. It
may have been used in cases involving nationals from the Dominican Republic, Hungary,
Romania, and Yugoslavia. Id.
302. See generally Stay of Deportation, supra note 251 (Since the early 1980s Congress has
shown an increasing interest in granting extended voluntary departure status to citizens of El
Salvador, a group with few successful asylum applicants).
303. Pub. L. No. 97-271, 96 Stat. 1157 (1982).
304. Id. § 2, 96 Stat. at 1157-58.
305. NORTH, supra note 148, at 17.
306. Id.
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time.
B.

Family Unification Under International Human Rights Law

The principles of family integrity and reunification arise not only in
domestic law, both State and Federal,3 07 but as a component of international law as well. Every international human rights document recognizes in some form the singular importance of the family within society
and its right to protection by the state."0 8 The United States implicitly
affirmed the fundamental role of the family as recently as 1975, by
signing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better
known as the Helsinki Accords.3"' In Basket 1111a of the Accords, entitled "Human Contacts," the parties committed themselves to "deal in a
positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who
wish to be reunified with members of their family."3' ' While Basket III
was directed at the Soviet practice of refusing to grant exit visas to an
entire family, thus conditioning immigration on the abandonment of
one's family, the commitment to the principles of the Accords is not
reduced because the United States is the offender. Indeed, in 1979 the
United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the agency authorized to monitor compliance with the Accords, published an extensive evaluation of the American record, focusing particularly on domestic compliance in the area of human rights.3 1'
The Commission reported that it was "not aware of any criticisms of
U.S. practices in [family reunification] from other CSCE countries or
domestic sources."3 13 At the time of the report, however, no legislation
307. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (AFDC); see infra note 331
(State law protections of family integrity).
308. American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, Art. 6, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/1I. 23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (English 1979) ("Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection therefor.").
309. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 1292, 1313 (1975) ("Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," § 1, Human
Contacts).
310. Basket I was devoted to issues of "confidence building" measures in the field of military
security, such as advance notice of field maneuvers. PROGRESS IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note, at 19.
Basket 1l's "overall objective is to promote through active inter-governmental cooperation, increased economic and scientific exchanges between the widely disparate economic system of East
and West." Id. at 32.
311. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 1292, 1314 (1975).
312. STAFF OF THE COMM'N ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 96TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., FULFILLING OUR PROMISES: THE UNITED STATES AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, A STATUS
REPORT 2 (Comm. Print 1979). The report was undertaken as a good faith response to criticism
by other signatory countries and internal Helsinki watch organizations regarding American implementation of the Accords in such areas as domestic surveillance, Indian rights, and political prisoners. Id.
313. Id. at 257. The report does not address "the problems of foreign migrant workers because
the Final Act clearly refers to such workers only in the context of movements between CSCE
countries in Europe. Likewise, the difficult and growing problem of illegal aliens in the U.S. is not
treated because there is no apparent basis for it in the Final Act." Id. at 5. The report notes,
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implicating the family unity of legalized aliens had been passed.
IRCA's failure to treat undocumented aliens as family groups now provides convincing evidence of violations of the Basket III provisions on
family reunification.
The recognition of family unity in the Helsinki Accords provides persuasive authority for the interpretation of IRCA in domestic courts.314
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit held in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics31 5 that "the Accords create obligations on the signatory
countries and establish goals which the nations will try to reach on
their own." 310 The court noted that the Accord's introductory passages
contemplate further action by the participating states to carry out the
provisions.317 Thus, while not a treaty-and therefore lacking the status
of federal law-the Accords can be used by courts in "infusing statutory standards with international human rights law."3 8 The United
States commitment to family reunification can be used much like a
legislative history in the statutory construction of IRCA. In Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith,3 19 for example, the Fifth Circuit noted that
"Ithe obligations of the United States as set forth in the [Geneva Convention and Protocol on Refugees] have informed the asylum policy of
the United States as expressed in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1253(h)."3 2 0 Similarly,
the obligations undertaken by the United States in signing the Helsinki
Accords should inform the interpretation of phrases like "family unity"
however, that "[tihe Commission maintains an open mind on these questions and is prepared to
revise its views on the basis of continuing evidence to the contrary." Id.
314. See generally Burke, Coliver, de la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of International
Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEXAS INT'L LJ. 291 (1983); Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367 (1985). As
these articles make clear, international law recognizes rights which may be invoked in domestic
courts. Such rights may be found in treaties or customary norms. In one recent case, for example,
torture was found to be a violation of customary international law, entitling plaintiffs to bring suit
under a federal statute conferring federal court jurisdiction over actions committed against aliens
in "violation of the law of nations." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
Several rules of construction, however, make direct enforcement of such rights unpromising. Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 n.34 (1957) (plurality) (customary norms and treaties superseded by
inconsistent, later-in-time federal statutes). Such constructional impediments include the requirement that customary norms be universally recognized and precisely defined and that only selfexecuting treaties are enforceable.
315. 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). Frolova, the American wife of a Soviet citizen, sued the
Soviet Union for mental distress and loss of consortium for its failure to permit her husband to
emigrate until one year after she had left the Soviet Union. Id. at 371. She argued that the Soviet
Union had waived its sovereign immunity by signing the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Accords.
In rejecting Frolova's claim the court explained that because the Helsinki Accords are not selfexecuting they do not have treaty status. Therefore, they do not create judicially enforceable
rights in private litigants. Id. at 376 n.8.
316. Id. at 375.
317. Id. at 376.
318. Lillich, supra note 314, at 408-12.
31,9. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). The Refugee Protocol itself addresses the importance of family unity, although it is limited to the treatment of civilians during times of war. Its
application in the context of IRCA may therefore be limited to undocumented aliens from Central
America.
320. Id. at 1029 n.8.
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and "humanitarian purpose" in IRCA. 32 '
In addition to the Helsinki Accords, the United States is a party to
the Charter of the United Nations, which specifically undertakes to
promote, encourage, respect, and observe human rights. 22 All member
states, including the United States, have pledged to cooperate for the
achievement of these purposes. 323 While the Charter does not itself de-

fine human rights, the phrase finds its most authoritative elaboration in
three supplemental documents: The Universal Declaration of Human
32 5
Rights, 2" the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Cultural
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
32 7
Rights. 26 Each stresses the singular importance of family.
United States commitment to these principles, like its commitment
to the Helsinki Accords, has been accepted in domestic courts. For ex-

ample, in Cerrillo-Perez v. INS a2 8 the Ninth Circuit remanded a suspension of deportation case because the Board of Immigration Appeals
had failed to consider the effect of the parents' deportation on their
three citizen children as an element of extreme hardship.3 2 9 In its deci-

sion, the court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noting that "[e]qually important, it is universally recognized that 'the
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.' ",3 Similarly, in a domestic
321. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
322. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3; id. art. 55.
323. Id. art. 56.
324. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948). The Universal Declaration is "now widely regarded as containing a universally recognized
catalogue of the human rights the UN deems essential." Lillich, supra note 314, at 378. As stated
by a former director of the U.N. Human Rights Division, "[Tihe Declaration is now binding on
all states. The Declaration has become what some nations wished it to be in 1948: the universally
accepted interpretation and definition of the human rights left undefined by the Charter."
Humphrey, The International Bill of Human Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976).
325. InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
326. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220 (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
327. The Universal Declaration states at art. 16(3) that "[tihe family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by the State." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly provides at art. 23(1) that "[t]he family is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State" and
at art. 24(1) that "[elvery child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State."
Finally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes at art. 10
that "[the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it
is responsible for the care and education of dependent children." It further states at art. 10(3)
that "[sipecial measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and
young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions."
328. 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987).
329. Id. at 1427.
330. Id. at 1423 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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custody case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that "the
role of parents in the life of a family has attained the status of a funda'
mental human right and liberty."881
So fundamental is the right of persons to maintain their families that

it has extended even to temporary migrant workers. The European
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers3 32 and several bilateral migrant worker treaties between European countries and laborexporting countries permit immediate family members to join the
worker.3 3 3 Migrant worker reunification policies have several implica-

tions for family unity in the context of IRCA. Most basic, treaty obligations and domestic laws increasingly recognize the right even of migrant workers to family integrity. If temporary foreign laborers,
ineligible to become permanent members of the host state, are entitled
to maintain their family structure, surely aliens to whom the state has
offered permanent residence should have corresponding entitlements. 4

Second, while reunification for temporary workers is sometimes conditioned on such factors as housing availability, 35 the right to family
unity for aliens admitted with the expectation of permanent residence
should be near absolute. 3 6 The factors governing consideration of family unity in most receiving countries, "reluctance to increase the foreign
segment of the population or to burden the national social security system, and the need of industry for mobile and cheap labour, 3 37 do not
apply to legalized aliens who are now members of the national commu331. State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978) (holding that State had not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that father's fundamental rights of his association with or privacy in his children should be terminated).
332. European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, opened for signature
Nov. 27, 1977, art. 12, 16 I.L.M. 1381, 1385. States may derogate from this general rule but
must inform the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe of any measures taken in derogation.
Id. Professor Lillich describes the European Convention as the "furthest progression of international human rights law with respect to migrant workers," because "the European Convention, to
a greater extent than any of the other bilateral or multilateral instruments [reviewed,] . . .concerns itself with the life of migrant workers in toto and not just with respect to the employment
relationship." R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 89 (1984). In this regard it stands in useful contrast to the historical treatment of migrant
alien labor. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
333. LILLICH, supra, at 108. Belgium, for example, allows family reunification after the completion of three months' work and subject to "the availability of suitable accommodations"; other
conditions imposed by European receiving countries include proof of good health and sufficient
resources. Id.
334. While the technical immigration status of legalized aliens is temporary resident status,
Congress clearly contemplated that legalization aliens would adjust to permanent status, as evidenced by its considerations of the long-term financial consequences of legalization. The "temporary" refers to the length of time in grade, rather than an end to resident status.
335. LILLICH, supra, at 91.
336. A state might exclude family members who fail to meet certain compelling admissions
criteria. Even in the context of exclusions, however, the Immigration and Nationality Act repeatedly provides for waivers based on the familial relationship. See 8 U.S.C. § l182(g),(h) (1982).
337. U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES at 21, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/189, U.N. Sales No.
E.86.IV.I I (1986) [hereinafter SOCIAL SITUATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS].
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nity. Third, in countries where migrant workers and their families enjoy equality of treatment with nationals, family reunification has often
been "facilitated by the similarity of climates, languages and customs
and the presence of many compatriots." 38
While the right of family members to live together is clearly a norm
within customary international law,339 it might be argued that a nation
that chooses to exclude alien family members may do so in vindication
of a countervailing incident of sovereignty.3 4" One commentator suggests, however, that the right of a nation state to exclude all aliens
from its territory is a relatively modern proposition based on a selective
misinterpretation of "ancient principles" that, in fact, claimed no absolute state right to bar all aliens.341 Municipal laws "disclose a state
practice . . . of admitting three important categories of aliens as immigrants for indefinite stays: refugees, dependents of resident aliens or
citizens, and applicants from nearby or otherwise closely affiliated
countries."3 4 Limitations on even the qualified right of states to exclude are guided by a hierarchy of norms. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides that laws regulating the admission of aliens
"shall not be incompatible with the international legal obligations of
that State, including those in the field of human rights."3 3 Respect for
family unity should guide immigration policies so that no inconsistency
between state sovereignty over admissions and the sovereignty of the
family itself need result: the decision of a state to admit an alien as a
338. SOCIAL SITUATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS at 20.
339. Family unity meets all the traditional indicia used by courts in determining that a particular practice or value has become part of the law of nations. Customary law or "the law of
nations" may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists ... or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." United States v.
Smith 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820). Other sources of customary international law
include the works of commentators, the U.N. Charter and Declarations, and other international
treaties and awards. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
For a practical review of the relative utilities of factors considered by courts in determining
whether a particular standard has reached the level of customary international law, see Gerstrel
& Segall, Conference Report: Human Rights in American Courts, I AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
137, 162-63 (1986) (Conference Report of the International Human Rights Law Group and the
International Legal Studies Program of The American University).
340. UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live, Ga. Res. 40/144 Annex, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 252,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986), provides that "(n)othing in this Declaration shall be interpreted . . .
as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of
aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay or to establish differences between nationals and
aliens." Full cite, art. 2.
341. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
804, 808-15 (1983). Nafziger concludes that authority for the absolute right to exclude derived
primarily from Anglo-American case law during the restrictionist period of the late 19th century,
and that subsequent restatement of this authority continued to elevate the exclusionary proposition
to lofty, but unjustifiable, heights. Id. at 823-24.
342. Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
343. Art. 2(I). (emphasis added) The Declaration further provides in Article 5 that "Subject
to national legislation and due authorization, the spouse and children of an alien lawfully residing
in the territory of a State shall be admitted to accompany, join, and stay with the alien."
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resident should encompass the immediate family as well.
IV.

CONCLUSION

IRCA's offer of legalization to undocumented aliens is marred by the
denial of a legal immigration status to nonqualifying spouses and children. IRCA has conditioned acceptance of lawful residence in the
United States on the abandonment of one's family to another country.
As a result, many undocumented families are not participating in the
amnesty program. The failure to respect the integrity of undocumented
families thus makes no practical sense in light of IRCA's goal of eliminating the illegal alien population, and no sense at all in view of the
national policies toward families.
Opposition to permitting ineligible relatives from staying mirrors historical objections to the settlement of migrant families: they are too
many, too expensive, and too undeserving. But the first two of these
arguments are unproven, and the third is a peculiar one in the context
of an amnesty program.
The INS has defended its refusal to establish a national policy on
family unity by crouching behind congressional intent-if Congress
had meant for families to stay it would have so provided. But congressional intent regarding family unity is not clear. By providing a special
waiver on the grounds of family unity, Congress acknowledged both the
potential problem and one form of the solution. While Congress failed
to extend derivative status to spouses and children, it did not remove
them from the protections of available administrative procedures commonly used in cases of family separations. Family unity may well be
another hard issue where "our representatives quite shrewdly prefer not
to have to stand up and be counted but rather to let' some executiveThe INS was
branch bureaucrat . . . 'take the inevitable heat.' ""
willing to risk the heat in issuing the Family Fairness guidelines permitting a small class of undocumented children to remain in the United
States with their amnesty-eligible parents.
The INS' deference to congressional intent in IRCA is selective. The
INS, "responding to pressure from Western agricultural interests, '34 5
has been willing to make a number of significant adjustments in the
eligibility and documentation requirements for Special Agricultural
Workers (SAWs).3 46 For example, the INS initially reported that
SAWs had to have been in the United States by May 1, 1987 to apply
344. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132 (1980) (citation omitted).

345. 64 Inter. Rel. 791 (July 6, 1987); id. at 801 (app. 11) (reprint of INS Statement on
Immigration Reform and Agricultural Labor (June 29, 1987)).
346. See supra note (SAW definitions in IRCA).
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for SAW status. In July 1987, the INS extended the date of entry,3" 7
thereby permitting more SAW applicants to enter the United States to
prove that they had worked the required "90 man-days" in American
agriculture from May 1, 1985 to May 1, 1986.34 The INS explained
that "the establishment of a cutoff date to avert a potential flow of
illegal aliens was a responsible and reasonable policy in support of the
primary purpose of IRCA. There is no contradiction if the date is adjusted in futherance of another IRCA objective, the maintenance of
agricultural production through legalization of the workforce."' "
The INS has characterized the legalization program as "reflecting
the Nation's humanitarian concerns for certain aliens who have been
residing illegally in the United States." 350 Date of entry into the United
States is the cause of ineligibility for members of undocumented family
members who arrived serially. No contradiction would result in the
INS' permitting spouses and children who arrived after January 1,
1982, but before IRCA's date of enactment, to remain with their legalized relative pending receipt of an immigrant visa. Indeed, such an adjustment furthers another congressional objective-the removal of the
undocumented population.
American generosity toward immigrants has rarely been so disingenuous. The INS does no violence to its regulations or to IRCA by extending indefinite voluntary departure status-already granted to some
amnesty-ineligible children-to the remaining and finite class of immediate relatives of legalized aliens. Doing so will contribute significantly
to meeting IRCA's goal of eliminating the illegal population within
America's borders and restore integrity to the treatment of alien families in the bargain.

347. 52 Fed. Reg. 28,663 (1987) (adjusting cutoff date from May 1, 1987 to June 26, 1987);
see id at 16,195 (adjusting cutoff date from Nov. 6, 1986 to May I, 1987). On December 22,
1987, an amendment to the SAW program eliminated altogether the cutoff date of entry for
eligibility to apply: aliens may file SAW legalization applications regardless of their date of entry
into the United States. Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 211 (1987).
348. 8 U.S.C.A. § l160(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
349. 52 Fed. Reg. 28,661 (1987).
350. 52 Fed. Reg. 8752 (1987).

